「黨管幹部」原則運作下的中國鄉鎮長選舉制度改革：困境與變通

中國鄉鎮長選舉制度的改革模式已普遍引起關注，儘管推動鄉鎮長直選尚未成為國家政策，但這意謂一種漸進主義式的草根民主政治發展，已能建立改革的激勵機制及為基層民主制度創新提供空間。改革鄉鎮長選舉方式其目標在於改變官員貪腐行為、提升地方治理品質及強化地方黨國權力合法性基礎。由於黨國體制的改革態度游離與立場猶疑，高層對鄉鎮長選舉改革尤其是直選缺乏一致性共識，阻礙鄉鎮長直選的全面性發展。本文試從「黨管幹部」此一組織原則，探討黨國體制介入鄉鎮長選舉制度變革及所面臨的發展困境；同時，黨國體制採取鄉鎮黨委「公推直選」的替代性改革方式，以變通或回應鄉鎮長直選要求。鄉鎮長選舉制度改革最大阻力來自於黨國體制，地方黨國恐損及黨領導地位的鞏固、政策支持，及衝擊鄉村治理深化體制矛盾。本文研究結果指出「黨管幹部」原則此一慣性深深束縛鄉鎮長選舉變革發展，大多數試點選舉並未能跳脫黨的控制，「公推直選」鄉鎮黨委已逐漸替代鄉鎮長直選模式。這顯示中共已以「黨內民主」改革，作為替代鄉鎮「基層民主」變通改革方案。在可預見未來，中國鄉鎮長選舉制度變革與直選發展，仍是步履蹣跚與前途未卜。

關鍵字

鄉鎮長選舉；黨管幹部；公推直選；黨內民主

並列摘要

Mode of the electoral system reform of township head has generally been a cause for concern in China, despite promote direct election of the township has not yet become national policy, but this means that a gradualist style grass-roots democracy political development, has been able to create the incentives for reform and supply innovation for the space of grassroots democratic system. Reform township head election goal is to change the corrupt behavior of local officials, to improve the quality of local governance and strengthen the legitimacy of the power of the local party-state. Attitude free with the stance and hesitation of the party-state system on township mayoral electoral reform, and the lack of consistency consensus hinder the comprehensive development of the direct election of township head. This paper tries to explore the party-state system from an organizing principle of ”the party-controlled cadres”, analyzing the influence from the interventional principle of township electoral system change and encounter dilemmas of development. Meanwhile, the mode of ”public nomination, direct election” toward the secretary of townships' party committee has been taken by the party-state system as alternative approach to reform, modify or respond to the township direct election requirements. The maximum resistance of the township electoral system reform was from the party-state system, local party-state fear of loss and the consolidation of the party leadership, policy support, and the impact of the deepening of rural governance system contradiction. The results of this study pointed out that ”the party-controlled cadres” principle, this inertia deeply bound the township head election reform, most experimental elections failed to escape the control of the party. The mode of direct election of township party secretary has gradually replaced the direct election mode of township head. This shows that the CCP has chosen the reform of ”inner-party democracy” as an alternative program to change ”grass-roots democracy”. China's township electoral system reform and directly elected development are still faltering and uncertain in the near future.