A Variant of the HB(superscript ++) Protocol Against Some Attacks

We study how to design an authentication protocol in a RFID system. We assume that both the tag and the reader share some secret keys. At Crypto'05, Juels and Weis provided the socalled HB(superscript +) protocol which is secure against the passive adversaries. However, Gilbert, Robshaw and Sibert described a man-in-the-middle attack (called GRS attack) against HB(superscript +). To be more secure, Bringer, Chabanne, and Dottax proposed a new protocol called HB(superscript ++) and prove its security against the GRS attacks. Later, at FC 2008, Gilbert, Robshaw, and Seurin generalized the original GRS attacks (called general GRS attack) and showed how to performs a general GRS attack against HB(superscript ++). Furthermore, in Eurocrypt 2008, the same authors provided a variant of HB(superscript +) (called random-HB(superscript ♯)) against the general GRS attack. However, their protocol requires the large space of the tag.In this work, we show how to modify the HB(superscript ++) protocol to obtain space-efficient authentication protocols against the general GRS attacks.

並列關鍵字

HB(superscript ++) ； active attacks ； RFID ； Learning Parity with Noise LPN ； authentication

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