針對一些攻擊提出HB++協定的變形

A Variant of the HB++ Protocol Against some Attacks

謝惠菁(Hui-Ching Hsieh)

指導教授 ： 張仁俊 ； 吳信龍

國立臺北大學/電機資訊學院/資訊工程學系/碩士(2011年)

摘要

我們研究在無線射頻辨識(簡稱RFID)系統裡該如何設計一種認證協定。我們假設電子標籤和讀取器之間共享一些秘密金鑰，在Crypto’05，Juels和Weis提供所謂的HB+協定，這個協定針對被動攻擊是安全的，然而，Gilbert、Robshaw和Sibert針對HB+描述一種居中攻擊，稱為GRS攻擊；但為了更加地安全，Bringer、Chabanne和Dottax提議一種新的協定，稱為HB++，他們針對GRS攻擊證明了它的安全性；之後，在FC 2008，Gilbert、Robshaw和Seurin使原本的GRS攻擊一般化(稱為general-GRS攻擊)，他們說明針對HB++該如何完成general-GRS攻擊；此外，在Eurocrypt 2008，同樣的作者們針對general-GRS攻擊提供一個HB+的變形(稱為random-HB#)，然而，他們的協定需要電子標籤儲存的空間較大，而且，在Asiacrypt 2008，由Ouafi、Overbeck和Vaudenay針對random-HB#協定提出最一般化的居中攻擊(稱為general-MIM攻擊)，此攻擊針對所有前人提出之HB系列的協定均能攻破。

在這篇論文中，我們針對general-GRS攻擊說明該如何修改HB++協定，以得到有效利用空間的認證協定，而且，我們的協定針對general-MIM攻擊亦是安全的。

關鍵字

HB++ ； 主動攻擊 ； 無線射頻辨識 ； Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) ； 驗證

並列摘要

We study how to design an authentication protocol in a RFID system. We as-sume that both the tag and the reader share some secret keys. At Crypto'05, Juels and Weis provided the so-called HB+ protocol which is secure against the passive adversaries. However, Gilbert, Robshaw and Sibert described a man-in-the-middle attack (called GRS attack) against HB+. To be more secure, Bringer, Chabanne, and Dottax proposed a new protocol called HB++ and prove its security against the GRS attacks. Later, at FC 2008, Gilbert, Robshaw, and Seurin generalized the original GRS attacks (called general-GRS attack) and showed how to performs a general-GRS attack against HB++. Furthermore, in Eurocrypt 2008, the same authors provided a variant of HB+ (called random-HB#) against the general-GRS attack. However, their protocol requires the large space of the tag. And, in Asiacrypt 2008, Ouafi, Overbeck, and Vaudenay proposed a general man-in-the-middle attack (called general-MIM attack) against random-HB#, which can also be applied to all anterior HB-like protocols.

In this work, we show how to modify the HB++ protocol to obtain space-efficient authentication protocols against the general-GRS attacks. Also, our protocol is secure against the general-MIM attack.

並列關鍵字

HB++ ； active attacks ； RFID ； Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) ； authentication

參考文獻

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