公營事業民營化之福利分析：一個結合Nash協商的民營化模型

本文以獨占的公營事業為對象，設立一個結合勞資協商機制的民營化模型，探討最適民營化決策，並分析民營化的福利效果。本文發現，協商是否涵蓋勞動數量，對民營化程度的決定與重分配效果均有不同。假如勞動數量和工資同時協商調整，則在特定的條件下，宜採完全民營，否則以局部民營為宜。在重分配效果方面，如勞動數量不變，民營化將增加企業利潤與消費者剩餘。惟若勞動數量一併裁減，則消費者剩餘減少，企業利潤是否進一步增加，視勞方對被解雇者的關注程度。民營化對勞工福利的影響，視生產力效果是否超越地租效果與政府的協商威脅效果而定。

關鍵字

民營化； Nash協商；所得重分配

並列摘要

This paper proposes a privatization model with Nash bargaining to analyze the determination of privatization and its distributional effects. We find that the optimal degree of privatization hinges on the post-privatization employment. The result of welfare analysis reveals that privatization is beneficial to both consumers and the stockholders of the privatized firm, if the employment is unchanged after privatization. However, if the employment is reduced through negotiation, consumer surplus will decrease, while the profit of the privatized firm will increase. The increment of profit in the latter circumstance depends on the labor union's care to laid-off employees. The net impact of privatization on employee depends on the effect on workers' productivity, the rent effect and government's threatening effect in the process of negotiation.

並列關鍵字

privatization ； Nash bargaining ； income redistribution

參考文獻

Avishur, A.(2000).A positive theory of privatization.Journal of Applied Economics.3（1）,1-55.

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