本文旨在探討<金融控股公司法>通過至今,本國金控子銀行與非金控銀行的經營效率表現。研究期間為2002-2006年,以本國13家金控子銀行與30家非金控銀行為樣本,分別從收入面和資產面衡量銀行產出,設定適合的超越對數成本函數,利用panel data中的固定效果模型估計,並透過規模經濟與成本互補性指標,從成本面探討本國銀行業之經營效率,以瞭解金控公司成立是否能為銀行業帶來改革的契機與效率的提升。本研究之主要發現如下:(1)規模經濟:無論從營收面或資產面定義銀行產出,金控子銀行皆不具規模經濟,反觀非金控銀行則表現較佳。(2)成本互補性:若從營收面定義產出,手續費收入與其他產出具有互補性,非金控銀行則是以投資收入較具成本互補性;在資產面定義下,則無論金控子銀行或非金控銀行,只在傳統的放款與投資資產間具成本互補性。(3)無論從營收面或資產面定義產出,金控公司跨業種類數增加不會降低金控子銀行成本。(4)金控子銀行並不具有成本上的優勢,其營業成本較非金控銀行高。
This paper studies the performances of subsidiary banks of Financial Holding Company (FHC) and banks of non-FHC after the pass of Financial Holding Company Act. We apply a translog cost function, a panel data fix-effect model, different definitions for output (by revenue and asset), as well as economies of scale and economies of scope index, to analyze the cost efficiency of 13 subsidiary banks of FHC and 30 banks of non-FHC for 2002-2006 and to see whether the FHC Act can bring more benefits and improve efficiency for Taiwan’s bank industry. Our major findings are: (1) Economies of scale: the subsidiary banks of FHC don’t have economies of scale under the two different definitions for output. (2) Economies of scope: if output is defined by revenue, fee revenue has cost complementary for subsidiary banks of FHC while cost revenue has for banks of non-FHC. If output is defined by asset, only loan has cost complementary with investment asset for both. (3) For FHC, mergers and acquisitions cross different industries don’t improve the cost efficiency of its’ subsidiary banks. (4) On average, the subsidiary banks of FHC don’t reveal better cost efficiency than the banks of non-FHC.