威廉森論斷言

Williamson on Assertion

高基生(Kei-Sang Kou)

指導教授 ： 楊金穆

國立臺灣大學/文學院/哲學研究所/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2012.00465

摘要

本文的目的是要借威廉森(Timothy Williamson)的知識論來論證斷言的知識規則，即是人們必須：在知道 p 時，才斷言 p。假定人們是可以通過斷言溝通，那麼人們便可以通過斷言溝通知識。這樣，威廉森的知識論便說明了人們可以通過斷言溝通知識；從而回應了懷疑論者的質疑：人們是否可以溝通知識。

關鍵字

威廉森 ； 斷言

並列摘要

The main thesis of this paper is to show that one is warranted to assert p if and only if one knows p. I will apply Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge First Epistemology to argue for this thesis. Because human beings do communicate with each others by assertions, if this thesis holds then human beings communicate knowledge by assertions. In this way, Williamson’s Knowledge First Epistemology replies to the sceptical challenge which doubts knowledge is able to be communicated.
Williamson proposed the notion of case in order to characterize a situation wherein the condition that one knows p obtains. In other words, one knows p if and only if one is in a case wherein the condition that one knows p obtains. Since one is warranted to assert p if and only if one knows p, one is warranted to assert p if and only if one is in a case wherein that the condition that one knows p obtains.
Incidentally, one must assert p only if one has suitable evidence, so that one is warranted to assert p if and only if one has suitable evidence. Since one is warranted to assert p if and only if one is in a case wherein the condition that one knows p obtains, one has evidence to assert p if and only if one is in a case wherein the condition that one knows p obtains. This leads to the consequence that one’s evidence is one’s knowledge. In this thesis, I will demonstrate Williamson’s argument for the thesis that one’s evidence is one’s knowledge.
Which case one is in determine one’s knowledge, evidence, and assertibility. This suggests that a class of cases wherein the condition that one knows p obtains is a model of one’s knowledge, evidence, and assertibility. In this thesis, I will indicate that Williamson provided such a elegant model for one’s knowledge, evidence, and assertibility. In this model, we only need to assume that there is a class of cases wherein the condition that one knows p obtains.

並列關鍵字

Williamson ； assertion

參考文獻

1. Ayer, A. J. 1972. Probability and Evidence. The MacMillan LTD.

3. Brueckner, A. 2005. ‘Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Mar., 2005), pp. 436-443.

4. — 2009. ‘E = K and Perceptual Knowledge’. Williamson on Knowledge. Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds). Oxford University Press, pp.5-11.

7. Cassam, Q. 2009. ‘Can the Concept of Knowledge be Analysed?’. Williamson on Knowledge. Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds). Oxford University Press, pp.12-30.

8. Descartes, R. 1996. Meditations on First Philosophy. John Gottingham (eds). Cambridge University Press.