研究對象以台灣交易所上市公司扣除非家族企業以及資料不足之樣本後，研究公司樣本數共236家，研究期間為2008年至2018年。實證結果發現，在外部董事比率與大股東持股方面對於經營績效皆呈現正向顯著影響；在股權席次偏離倍數對於經營績效呈現負向顯著影響。在干擾效果部分，家族成員接班並未能對家族企業公司治理與經營績效產生干擾效果。
本文主要貢獻為實證公司治理是否會改善家族企業接班後與經營績效之影響，透過實證分析，結果顯示公司治理能夠改善家族企業經營績效，可供家族企業制定接班計畫時作為參考依據，使家族企業更重視強化公司治理的建立並使政府立法單位制訂更完善的公司治理制度。

This research examines the impact of family business corporate governance (external director ratio, proportion of shareholding by major shareholders and deviation degree of equity interest as parameters) on firm performance, and the moderating effect on the relationship of corporate governance and firm performance of family businesses.
We take samples from the listed companies in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. The final samples (listed companies) are 236 after deducting those non-family businesses and those with insufficient data. The research period is from 2008 to 2018. The empirical results show that, both the ratio of external directors in the company and the proportion of holdings by the major shareholder, have positive impact on firm performance； While the deviation degree of equity interest is having a negative impact on firm performance. In the part of moderating effect, succession of family members failed to interfere with the results of family business governance and business performance.
The main contribution of this paper is to study whether corporate governance can improve the company business after family members’ succession, and the impact on the business performance. Through an empirical analysis, it is found that corporate governance can effectively improve the business performance of family businesses. The research results can be used as a reference for family businesses to develop their succession plans. Meanwhile, family businesses can focus their efforts in strengthening the establishment of corporate governance. Also, the results can be of use for government legislative units to develop a better corporate governance system.

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