本文以公共選擇理論作品研究途徑,嘗試解釋立法院三讀通過之全民健保法有關勞資雙方保費負擔比例的訂定,其實充滿政策利害關係人自利之考量。藉由公共選擇理論所持之假定,本文欲觀察三項命題:政策主要決策者受選票影響甚鉅;政策因主要決策者之自利考量成為「準公共財」(quasi-public goods)偏私於相對上較為強勢之團體,即資方;最後之政策規定並非最理性之產物。透過此一觀察,本文發現:全民健保法有關勞資雙方保費負擔比例之主要決策者受選票影響甚鉅。其次,該政策因主要決策者之自利考量偏私於相對上較為強勢的賣方。從而,最後的政策往往為次佳之結果;因此,得使上述命題獲致初步印證。
This paper attempts to explain the policy-making that the percentage of insurance premiums bore employers and employees of the Universal Health Insurance plan based on self-interested concerns from policy stakeholders. Taking assumptions underlying public choice theory, this paper explores three propositions: the votes affect the decision-making of the major policy maker, policy is usually a quasi-public goods-policy favors the strong who they are employers, and policy is usually not the rational outcome out of these policy-making processes. The observation confirms those propositions.