| 摘要Abstract | 國內過去有關審計公費之研究，受限於資料的取得，多以問卷 調查方式進行探討，且對審計市場是否存在公費溢酬情形，未獲一致 結論。本研究以 2002 年至 2005 年符合證期局規範條件而須揭露審計 公費之上市、上櫃與興櫃公司為樣本，並參考 Chaney et al. (2004) 之 研究，採用 Heckman (1979) 之兩階段程序，探討公司聘任會計師之自 我選擇考量對審計公費定價之影響。實證結果顯示，控制公司自我選 擇會計師事務所的影響後，台灣審計市場不存在大型事務所公費溢酬 之現象，與 Chaney et al. (2004) 的發現ㄧ致。另一方面，本研究亦考 量客戶議價能力對審計公費之影響，將樣本區分為大、小規模客戶群 分析，研究結果顯示國內僅在小規模客戶群中存有公費溢酬之現象。 此結果符合 Casterella et al. (2004) 之研究所述，小規模公司的議價能 力相對較低，因此大型會計師事務所可在小規模客戶群中收取較高的 審計公費。Audit fees have been partially publicly disclosed in Taiwan since 2002. Before 2002, most of the research was based on survey information to examine audit fees’ research in Taiwan. In addition, there is still no consistent empirical evidence indicating whether there is a name-brand premium in Taiwan’s audit market. Following Chaney et al. (2004), this study uses the two-stage procedure proposed by Heckman (1979) to examine whether self-selection of auditors will affect audit pricing and to investigate whether clients firms choosing name-brand auditors will need to pay higher fees. Our research samples focus on those firms trading stocks in Taiwan stock markets (TSE and OTC market) and disclosing audit fees based on the requirement of Securities and Futures Bureau from 2002 to 2005. Consistent with the findings of Chaney et al. (2004), we do not find a Big 4 premium as we control for self-selection bias of auditors. Furthermore, this study considers the role of clients’ bargaining power in the audit pricing process and finds that only smaller client firms choosing name-brand auditors have to face higher audit fees. |