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    期刊


    項目資料
    卷期
    Vol. & No.
    第17卷第1期

    Vol 17 No. 1
    標題
    Title
    薪酬委員會品質、高階經理人現金紅利薪酬與企業績效關聯性之研究

    The Association between Quality of Compensation Committee, Managers’ Cash Bonuses and Firm Performanc
    作者
    Authors
    朱炫璉 劉乃熒 陳彥綺 吳品萱
    Hsuan-Lien Chu Nai-Yng Liu Yen-Chi Chen Pin-Hsuan Wu
    出版日期
    Publish Date
    2016-05-31
    摘要
    Abstract
    本文從薪酬誘因與董事會監督機制兩個公司治理構面,探討高階主管薪酬結 構與支配能力,對企業裁減研發支出之短視行為的影響。實證結果發現,在自利的 動機下,高階主管會利用裁減研發支出方式,提高當期盈餘以增加其薪酬。而提高 高階主管股票基礎薪酬比率,會降低裁減研發支出的可能性,且在股票基礎導向的 薪酬結構下,透過股票基礎薪酬比率降低企業裁減研發支出的可能性,會高於現金 基礎導向的薪酬結構。此外高階主管具支配能力,所受監督的程度較低,出現裁減 研發支出的可能性較高,但是提高股票基礎薪酬比率,所降低裁減研發支出可能性 的效果,反而會較大。

    The objective of this study is to discuss the substitution effect of managers’ cash bonuses and the quality of compensation committee on firm performance. In this study we used public listed companies in Taiwan as our study sample and our sample period is from Jan. 2011 to Dec. 2012. Cash bonus were used as a proxy for managers’ incentive compensation, and five quality characteristics (directors’ seniority, size of compensation committee, frequency of meetings, members attendance rate and proportion of independent directors) were used to measure the quality of compensation committee. We used two-stage least squared regression to examine the effect of the quality of compensation committee on the association between managers’ cash bonuses and firm performance. Our results found that there is a substitution relationship exists between managers’ cash bonuses and the quality of the compensation committee. This provides evidence for the supposition that companies with a high quality compensation committee could reduce cash bonuses and still achieve the same business performance.
    關鍵字
    KeyWords
    薪酬委員會品質、現金紅利薪酬、企業績效

    compensation committee quality, cash bonuses, performance
    DOI
    (全文下載
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    10.6675/JCA.2016.17.1.03
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