本研究旨在探討公司治理機制對上市公司財務報表品質的影響。研究結果發現,公司治理機制的成效受到公司是否為家族控制企業的影響很大。如果公司是屬於家族控制企業,董事會明顯欠缺獨立監督功能,在經理人自律效果中,持股走去超過25%以上,反應的是管理者掠奪利益論。因而,家族控制企業之公司治理機制除外資法人外,不會有太明顯的監督效果。但如果公司是屬於非家族控制企業,則本研究發現,董事會規模愈大,基本上監督功能愈強,機構法人的監督力量以投信法人為主,至於管理者的自律機制,當持股比率在5%以下時,恰反應出利益一致論。整體而論,除董事會獨立性外,公司治理機制監督的成效與公司經營權是否掌握在控制家族有關。另在額外測試部分,次大股東的存在與常務董事會中董事會的獨立性,確實具有提昇報表品質的效果。
This study aims to examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of financial statements, and explores whether family control of the firm has an impact on this association. The results show that whether a remarkable effect of corporate governance will emerge is determined by specific board construction. It is distinct that the presence of family controlled boards will have an adverse effect on governing firm management, which thereby causes most corporate governance mechanisms to be useless. On the contrary, for non-family controlled firms, such governance mechanisms as board size, securities investment trust enterprises and managerial shareholdings serve to narrow the accounting discretion, which in turn will enhance the reliability of financial reporting. Moreover, this study also reveals that outside or independent directors and supervisors, if planted on the managing boards, definitely have a positive influence on the quality of financial reports. A positive relation is also identified between financial reporting quality and the incidence of at least one large blockholder (at least 5% shareholdings) in firm.