獨立董監之設置決策與績效

The Decision of Having Independent Members on the Board and Its Relation to Performance

陳宜伶(Yi-Ling Chen) ； 林宛瑩(Wan-Ying Lin)

《管理與系統》 20卷4期 (2013/10) Pp. 697-725

摘要

本研究從企業之股權結構與公司特性的觀點，探討設置獨立董監之決定因素及其對後續績效之影響。由於獨立董監之設置係決定於公司（董事會）設置意願與獨立董監出任的意願，本文提出獨立董監的自我選擇假說，預期獨立董監設置前績效較佳之公司，公司與獨立董監合意的機率較大，因此設置獨立董監之可能性及席次比例較高。我們發現，股權結構變數中，外部大股東持股與內部人持股高之公司，以及公司特性變數中，設置前績效表現差、電子業者、競爭程度高與公司規模大之企業，設置獨立董監之可能性與席次比率較高；控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度高及家族控制之公司，則較低。最後，在控制設置前期間之績效表現下，在設置組中，設置前期間績效較差（佳）之樣本其後續績效顯著提升（衰退）。我們的實證發現未支持獨立董監之設置決策符合自我選擇假說，而設置獨立董監之效益則支持增進績效之論點，但僅限於設置前績效差之公司。

關鍵字

獨立董監 ； 股權結構 ； 公司特性 ； 績效

並列摘要

This study investigates the impact of ownership structure and firm characteristics on decisions of having independent members on the corporate boards and its relation to firm performance. Since well-performed firms are usually perceived to be less risky, we propose the self-selection hypothesis predicting that better performed firms tend to have more independent members on their board. We find that firms with greater shares held by blockholders and insiders (firms with higher deviation of voting rights from cash flow rights and family-controlled firms) are significantly and positively (negatively) associated with the board independence. We also find that firms with poorer prior performance, operating in the electronic industry, facing greater market competition and larger firm size are associated with greater board independence. Finally, after controlling prior performance, we observe a more obvious improve (decline) trend in subsequent performance for boards with poor (better) prior performance and independent members. Thus the evidence does not support our self-selection hypothesis and the firms with poor prior performance and independent members have a positive effect on subsequent performance.

並列關鍵字

Independent Board Member ； Ownership Structure ； Firm Characteristic ； Performance

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