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總額支付制度下醫院同儕行為之競合:賽局理論分析

Hospital Competition under Global Budgeting: A Game Theory Analysis

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摘要


醫院總額支付制度於民國九十一年七月一日開始實施,然而根據中央健康保險局的資料試算,醫院總額支付制度實施首季,醫院的支付點值每點將由一元下降至0.9493元,此結果顯示在醫院總額支付制度下,各醫院的服務量不減反增,進而導致健保局支付給醫院的每點支付值下降。本文利用賽局理論的分析架構,探討總額支付制度下醫院同儕行為之競合。研究結果發現,在考量醫院本身的利益下,選擇高服務量是不得不選擇的策略(優勢策略),主要是因為擔心競爭對手不配合,自己選擇低服務量反而蒙受損失。各家醫院在無法確定其他醫院會減少服務量的情形下,自然沒有誘因去降低本身的服務量,若是其他醫院進一步的擴大服務量,勢必對自己更加不利,因此在考量對手的可能策略後,提高本身服務量是理性而且對自己最為有利的選擇策略。因此,全民健保的醫院總額支付制度實施後,醫院的支付點值下降,乃此策略競賽的結果。換句話說,在醫院總額支付制度實施後,醫院間除了必須合力才能對外爭取更多的預算與醫療支付,同時更應彼此策略合作方能獲得最大的利益。但是由於彼此競爭的關係永遠存在,因此在總額支付制度下,醫院似乎正陷入賽局理論中「囚犯兩難」的內憂外患局面。

並列摘要


Hospital global budget system was officially launched on the 1st of July 2002. According to the data showed by the Bureau of National Health Insurance, medical payment per service point received by hospital have dropped by 5.1% from one dollar to 0.9493 dollar in the first three months under the system. This means that hospitals increase services instead of reducing services under hospital global budget system. Such an unexpected outcome may be resulted from the competition among hospitals. In this paper, we use game theory analysis to discuss hospital competition under global budgeting. The results show that each hospital has a dominant strategy because the high output choice is the best no matter what the other hospitals do. In the game, self- interest on the part of each hospital will lead to a result in which all hospitals are worse off than they would be if low output choices were made. Consequently, each hospital receives less per service point payment due to an increase in the total amount of medial services. Therefore, hospitals are currently trapped in a prisoner s dilemma game under hospital global budget system.

參考文獻


(2001)。中央健康保險局全民健康保險統計
(2002)。中央健康保險局統計資料
(2002)。第一期醫院總額支付制度。中央健康保險局。
Browning and Zupan(1999).Microeconomics Theory & Application.Addision Wesley.

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