交易成本的分析與估算－以台南市成功保齡球館的模擬協商為例

北高兩市分別於其主要計晝中增訂社區參與規定，要求業者須取得毗鄰住户一定比例的同意，才得以轉變原土地使用為商業使用。在此種規定下，業者須發動此一協商過程。根據Coase定理，當交易成本小於土地使用轉變後業者所能得到的利潤時，就會發生市場交易。換句話說，前述作法就可以發揮其功能。本研究藉著推動台南市成功保齡球館與周圍社區住户的模擬協商，以試行此高兩市的社區參與規定，並估算交易成本的大小。此外，亦發現交易成本將由交易中主動的一方負擔，且決策成本會是交易成本中的主要部分。

關鍵字

Coase定理；交易成本；協商

並列摘要

The master plans of Taipei City and Kaohsiung City prescribe a mechanism of community participation. If investors can obtain the consents of neighboring land owners through that mechanism, they will get land use variance which allow them to set up their businesses legally. Under the mechanism, the investors must initiate the process of negotiation. Coase theorem indicates that when transaction costs is less than the profits obtained from land use variance, trades will occur. Then the mechanism will function. The study is to simulate a negotiation between a community and a bowling alley, following the prescription of the aforementioned mechanism of community participation, and to compute transaction costs. The result shows that the sum of transaction costs is not large and the mechanism can work, that transaction cost will fall upon the initiating parties, and that decision costs consists of a large part of transaction costs.