雙占市場下管理授權與轉撥訂價之等同性分析

企業常因不同的內部組識架構而採取不同的管理策略。有垂直部門化的廠商，將由企業決策核心利用轉撥訂價作為一策略工具，來影響銷售部門的行為反應，以取得整個企業集團的最大利潤。而沒有垂直部門化的廠商，其產品的製造與銷售由單一經理人管理，組識可採取的管理授權的方式，藉此透過邊際成本影響市場的決策，進而達成利潤移轉的目標。本文以轉撥訂價及管理授權這兩個非對稱性工具作為模型之基礎，討論其策略性效果是否具有等同性之議題。結果發現，縱使不同策略工具會形成企業的目標函數有不同的線性組合，轉撥訂價與管理授權在本文中被証明是具有等同性的。也就是，企業不會因這兩個策略工具選擇的不同而有不同的市場均衡結果。本文也將模型延伸，討論策略工具領導者模型，並顯示策略工具由同時決策改變成循序決策，將使得領導者具有市場份額及利潤移轉之優勢，雖然整體產業的利潤下降了，但社會福利卻因消費者剩餘的提昇而更為增進。

關鍵字

管理授權；轉撥訂價；等同性

並列摘要

Vertical divisionalization firms' headquarters may use transfer price as an instrument to influence marketing division's behavior and maximize profit of the whole firm. Managers are in control of product manufacturing and selling in non-divisionaliztion firms. Firms without adopting vertical integration may use managerial incentive to affect manager's decision through a change in marginal cost in order to shift profit. Incorporate two asymmetric instruments, transfer pricing and managerial delegation into Cournot duopoly model, it shows that the use of transfer pricing and managerial delegation has equivalence outcome even though different strategy will cause firms' objective function with different linear combination. In other words, the market equilibrium outcome will still be the same even though different instruments are used. Instrument simultaneous move were replaced by instrument-leading move in a Stackelberg leader model, leader will have advantage to capture market share and shift profit, and consequently social welfare improves due to consumer surplus increase, and profit decrease.

並列關鍵字

Managerial Delegation ； Transfer Pricing ； Equivalence Outcome

參考文獻

Baldenius, T.,N. Melumad,S. Reichelstein(2004).Integrating Managerial and Tax Objectives in Transfer Pricing.Accounting Review.79(3),591-615.

Google Scholar

Barteisman, E. J.,R. M. W. J. Beetsma(2003).Why Pay More? Corporate Tax Avoidance through Transfer Pricing in OECD Countries.Journal of Public Economics.87(9),2225-2252.