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面對網路商店進入下雙通路競爭之定價策略

Optimal Pricing under Cross-Channel Competition: Internet versus Traditional Stores

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摘要


本研究考慮單一製造商面對著傳統通路(零售商)和直接銷售通路(網路商店)的多通路結構之下,討論網路商店進入前後,對零售商與製造商定價策略的影響。網路商店尚未進入市場時,製造商及零售商間存在著Stackelberg game領導者及跟隨者的關係。在網路商店進入該市場後,網路商店成為市場的領導者,決定最適營收分享比例。製造商同時透過網路商店直接販售商品或是透過傳統零售商進行販售,此時兩通路結構的價格將交互影響。換句話說,製造商不僅供應零售商產品,也會變成競爭對手。透過Stackelberg均衡分析達到最大利潤的訂價策略,並觀察兩通路成員的價格與利潤高低,來提供決策者做決策考量。數值上驗證發現當網路商店進入競爭市場後的零售商訂價會低於網路商店未進入市場之前,而且網路售價會比實體零售價格低。在利潤方面,有網路商店下的競爭市場會有較高的整體利潤表現,而零售商利潤會降低、但是製造商卻會提高。雖然網路商店進入會使實體零售商受到壓力,但如果製造商提供一個優惠的批發價給零售商,可以讓零售商的利潤提高。製造商會有所損失但是還是會比沒有競爭環境下的利潤來的高。當消費者對於市場的價格差異敏感度高時,價格會成一定比例的下降,且有利於製造商的利潤、而不利於零售商。

並列摘要


We consider the problem of one manufacturer selling one product in the market through two competing channels: a physical channel (retailer) and a direct channel (internet store). We focus our analysis to study the effect of the dual-channel pricing on the retailer and manufacturer when facing an internet store entry. We use a game-theoretical approach and the sequence of moves in the Stackelberg game. The internet store is the Stackelberg leader who provides a revenue-sharingcontract to the manufacturer. The manufacturer will decide his price of internet channel, and theretailer will decide his price of traditional retail channel. We study the profits and prices of the retailer and manufacturer when facing an internet store entry and analyze the effects of key parameters on their profits and price by numerical example. Numerical results show that the retailer and manufacturer both generate lower pricesand the manufacturer have better profit than before. The retailer's profit would be better due to the manufacturer offers a lower wholesale price. When the cross-price sensitivityis increasing, the retailer and manufacturer'sprices is decreasing and lower manufacturer's profit.

參考文獻


Bock, G. W., Lee, S. Y. T., & Li, H. Y. (2007). Price comparison and price dispersion: Products and retailers at different Internet maturity stages. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 11(4), 101-124.
Bretthauer, K. M., Mahar, S., & Venakataramanan, M. A. (2010). Inventory and distribution strategies for retail/e-tail organizations. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 58(1), 119-132.
Cachon, G. P., & Lariviere, M. A. (2005). Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations. Management Science, 51(1), 30-44.
Cai, G., Zhang, Z. G., & Zhang, M. (2009). Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes. International Journal of Production Economics, 117(1), 80-96.
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被引用紀錄


Chen, Y. C., & Hsieh, Y. C. (2022). SERVICE INDICES OF OMNICHANNEL RETAILING. 品質學報, 29(1), 47-67. https://doi.org/10.6220/joq.202202_29(1).0003

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