授權、關稅與社會福利

Licensing, Tariffs, and Social Welfare

陳彥勲(Yan-Syun Chen)

指導教授 ： 黃鴻

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2021年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU202102232

摘要

本文使用一本國廠商和一外國廠商的雙占模型，分析在單位權利金授權方式下的關稅政策和技術轉移的效果。此外，我們也比較了在不同授權方式下的社會福利和稅率高低。結果發現在單位權利金授權方式下，不管政府有無課稅，技術轉移必會發生，然而消費剩餘會隨稅率而下降。另外，在線性需求的假設下，我們發現固定金授權(單位權利金授權)方式的社會福利會最高(低)，最適稅率最低(高)，而兩階段定價授權方式則介於兩者之間。再者，我們建構一個公民營混合的本國廠商和一民營外國廠商的雙占模型，並假設市場需求為線性，探討固定金授權方式下，民營程度對關稅政策和技術轉移的效果，結果發現降低民營化程度會使得引導技術轉移所需的稅率下降，而且技術轉移在低民營化程度時必然發生，此外，在民營化程度足夠低的情況下，最適稅率會是一禁止性關稅。

關鍵字

跨國技術轉移 ； 關稅壁壘 ； 社會福利 ； 授權契約 ； 民營化

並列摘要

The aim of this paper is to study the effects of a tariff policy on social welfare and international technology transfer. We not only construct a duopolistic trade model but also apply royalty licensing to it. Besides, we compare the optimal tariff rate and social welfare under different licensing contracts. Under royalty licensing, technology transfer always occurs, and tariff rates decrease consumer surplus. With the assumption of the linear market demand, we find that the optimal tariff rate under royalty (fixed-fee) licensing is the highest (lowest), social welfare under fixed-fee (royalty) licensing is the highest (lowest), and both are in-between under two-part tariff licensing. Besides, we consider a model with one private firm competing with one partially privatized public firm in a domestic market under fixed-fee licensing and assume that the market demand is linear. We find that the tariff, which induces technology transfer, increases with the degree of privatization; furthermore, technology transfer always occurs under a low privatization degree. Additionally, the optimal tariff rate is prohibitive when the degree of privatization is significantly low.

並列關鍵字

International technology transfer ； tariff barriers ； social welfare ； licensing contracts ； privatization

參考文獻

1.Arora A., Fosfuri, A., and Gambardella, A., 2010, “Markets for technology”, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.

2.Bárcena‐Ruiz, J.C. and Garzón, M.B., 2005, “International trade and strategic privatization”, Review of Development Economics Vol. 9, 502–513.

3.Brander, J.A., and Spencer, B.J, 1984, “Trade warfare: Tariffs and cartels”, Journal of International Economics Vol. 16, 227-242.

4.Chang, W.W., 2005, “Optimal trade and privatization policies in an international duopoly with cost asymmetry”, Journal of International Trade and Economic Development Vol. 14, 19–42.

5.Chao, C.C., and Yu, E.S.H., 2006, “Partial privatization, foreign competition, and optimum tariff”, Review of International Economics Vol. 14, 87–92.