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國際技術授權與差別關稅

International Technology Licensing and Discriminatory Tariff

摘要


本文透過Brander-Spencer模型,探討進口國專利權人技術授權給出口國廠商,對於進口國差別性關稅政策排序所產生之影響。課徵關稅對社會福利存在負面的數量效果以及正面的貿易條件效果。本文透過進口國專利權人的技術授權,引進了關稅對社會福利所存在負面的權利金效果。Hwang and Mai(1991)所提出的「高成本、低關稅」的課徵原則,可能不成立。

並列摘要


This paper uses the Brander-Spencer model to explore the impact of the technology licensing of the patentee's in the importing country to the firms in the exporting country on the order of discriminatory tariff policies in the importing country. The levy of tariffs has a negative quantitative effect and a positive terms of trade effect on social welfare. This study introduced the negative royalty effect of tariffs on social welfare through the technology licensing of the patentee of the importing country. The principle of "high cost, low tariff" proposed by Hwang and Mai (1991) may not be hold.

參考文獻


吳世傑、楊雅博、黃鴻,外籍廠商之技術授權:關稅與配額政策的比較,「經濟論文叢刊」,第三十卷第一期,2002 年,頁 49-75。
蔡明芳、楊雅博,技術授權與最適貿易政策,「經濟論文叢刊」,第四十四卷第四期,2016 年,頁 641-658。
Arrow, K., “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in R.R. Nelson (Ed.), The Rate and Direction of Incentive Activity, 1962, pp.609-626. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Brander, J.A. and B.J. Spencer, “Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,” Journal of International Economics, 18, 1985, pp.83-100.
Chang, R.Y., Hwang, H. and C.H. Peng, “Discriminatory vs. Uniform Tariffs with International Technology Licensing,” Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, 23(3), 2016, pp. 268-277.

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