預期樂觀對交易時間的影響

Optimism and Bargaining Delay

莊亞涵(Ya-Han Chuang)

指導教授 ： 梁孟玉

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/經濟學研究所/碩士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2009.01485

摘要

本文旨在分析「樂觀的預期」會如何影響交易時間的延遲。此篇模型
是先固定交易物品的耐久性，再在這段物品使用期限內，將時間細分
為許多期。擁有這個耐久財可以享受其所提供的服務，在每一期都得
到相同效用。買賣雙方對於未來他是否能出價，各自有一個主觀上的
認定。我們證明在某些情況之下，延遲交易的時間是顯著的。

關鍵字

樂觀 ； 預期 ； 出價 ； 耐久財 ； 延遲交易

並列摘要

This paper analyze the role of optimism in bargaining delay as
Yildiz(2003) did. Given the life time of the durable goods, owner can obtain the same value every period. Each player may hold his subjective belief about being recognized in the future. We find possibility that delay is significant when bargaining periods grows into infinite.

並列關鍵字

optimism ； bargaining delay ； durable goods ； recognized ； subjective belief

參考文獻

[1] Ali, S. Nageeb M. (2006) Waiting to Settle:Multilateral Bargaining with Subjective Biases, Journal of Economic Theory, 130, 109-137.

[2] Ariel Rubinstein. (1982), Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 97-109.

[3] Babcock Linda, George,Loewenstein . (1997) Explaining Bargaining Impasse: TheRole of Self-Serving Biases, Journal of Economic Perspectives,11, 109-126.

[5] Muhamet Yildiz. (2003), Bargaining Without a Common Prior-an Immediate Agreement Theorem, Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 3, 793-811.

[6] Raymond Deneckere and Meng-Yu Liang. (2008), Imperfect durability and the Coase Conjecture, The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 39: Iss. 1,pp. 1-19.