委託書交易市場化之研究

台灣現行關於委託書規則依《公司法》第177條及《證券交易法》第25條之1訂定《公開發行公司出席股東會使用委託書規則》。委託書徵求的情況，以1996年為重要區隔點；1996年以前，委託書可以用金錢交易，委託書的收購有一定行情，也出現了許多以收購委託書為業的業者。當時不少以委託書收購進而取得公司董監事席次或是經營權的情況，公司經營階層面臨挑戰。但在1996年後，修正委託書使用規則，不得以給付金錢或其他利益為條件取得委託書，至此委託書收購轉趨地下化。金融監理當局不斷修正委託書規則，增加委託書徵求的成本，使市場派挑戰公司經營階層的門檻更高，甚至出現僅有少數股權的經營者，藉由委託書徵求或收購，壟斷公司經營權的現象。比如金鼎證2006年的董監事改選，即為是例。本文研究摘要如下： (1)現行委託書規則修正朝向「加強公司治理、強化委託書管理」、「加強資訊揭露、便利股東權之行使」二大方向。然一味禁止價購委託書，反而造成委託書交易地下化，則委託書收購亂象依然無法杜絕，有損股東權益。 (2)本文討論開放委託書交易的可行性，包括分析委託書與股東權益關係、比較國內外現行委託書徵求制度、討論委託書市場化之可行性、委託書市場化是否有害公司內部民主、委託書市場化禁止或開放對於股東權益變動及公司治理效率之影響、委託書市場化所帶來資訊揭露效果是否可以改善長久以來股東與公司經營階層間「資訊不對稱」問題、如何以委託書市場化提昇公司治理透明度、健全監督制衡機制等。

關鍵字

委託書規則；委託書徵求；委託書交易；資訊不對稱；董監事改選

並列摘要

For the stipulation of the “Attorney of Power” in Taiwan, the “Rules Governing the Proxy Issued by the Public Offering Company for Attending Shareholder’s Meeting” is stipulated in accordance with “Company Law” Article 177 and “Security Transaction Regulations” Article 25.1. Proxy has been recruited differently before and after 1996. Proxy can be traded for a price before 1996; therefore, there were many proxy traders in practice. The seat of director and supervisor and business operation had been acquired by proxy traders; therefore, the management of the organization faced severe challenge. The rule for proxy recruiting has been changed after 1996, in other words, proxy cannot be solicited with money or profits change hands; therefore, the soliciting proxy has gone underground. Financial Supervisory Commission has modified the rule of proxy recruiting continuously and with proxy recruiting cost increased to make it difficult for the investors to challenge the company’s management. Therefore, the management is sometimes with very few shareholdings and has monopolized the management of the company by proxy recruiting or soliciting, for example, the board directors and supervisor election of Taiwan International Securities Group in 2006. The summary of this study is: (1)The current proxy rules amendment towards “reinforcing company governance and proxy management,” “reinforcing information disclosure for the convenience of shareholders.” The suppression of soliciting proxy forces it to go underground but without solving the problem to the detrimental of shareholder’s equity. (2)The feasibility of open proxy solicitation is discussed in this study including analyzing the relationship between proxy and shareholder’s equity, comparing domestic and international proxy recruiting system, discussing the feasibility of proxy commercialized, whether proxy commercialization is harmful to internal democracy, the impact of proxy commercialization on shareholder’s equity and company governance efficiency, whether the information disclosure of proxy commercialization can help correct the “information Asymmetry” between shareholders and the company’s management, how to upgrade company governance transparency with proxy commercialization, and substantiating surveillance and monitoring mechanism.

並列關鍵字

Proxy Rules ； Proxy Contest ； Proxy Trade ； Information Asymmetry ； Board Directors and Supervisors election

參考文獻

1. Berle, A. and. Means, G. (1932) , “The Modern Corporation and Private Property.” Macmillan, New York.

2. AdolfA. Berle, (1962) , “Modern Functions of the Corporate System. ” Columbia Law Review 62 pp. 443-449.

3. Jensen M. C. and Meckling W. H. (1976) , “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.3, pp305-360.

5. Deangelo, Linda Elizabeth, (1988), “Managerial Competition, Information Costs, and Corporate Governance: The Use of Accounting Performance Measures in Proxy Contests.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 10, pp3-36.

6. DeAngelo, Herry, and DeAngleo, Linda (1989) , “Proxy Contests and The Governance of Publicly Held Corporations” Journal of Finance Economics ,23,pp.29-59.

國際替代計量

委託書交易市場化之研究

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