非專利實施實體(NPE)不事生產,透過專利收購、專利授權與爭訟,將專利資產化以獲取收益。NPE在美國聯邦法院提出專利訴訟,策略性要求被控侵權企業給付高額之損害賠償金,或威脅禁止侵權產品在美國銷售,達到專利挾持之目的。雖然NPE認為他們的商業模式是提供資金予發明人從事創新和競爭,並且促進科技市場的交易效率。但事實上,NPE之商業模式可能會阻礙專利之擴散與運用。此新型態商業模式運用問題專利,超額領取權利金,已經對於全球大型資通訊技產業造成影響,因此亦有人以帶有負面意涵的專利蟑螂一詞,來描述這類企業體。本論文針對NPE商業模式進行研究,分析二間具代表性的NPE—Acacia和Intellectual Ventures之商業模式與營運邏輯,藉由透析NPE之商業模式,期以提供未來因應NPE之規範觀點。
Nonpracticing Entities (NPE) are firms that rarely or never practice their patents, and instead focus on earning licensing fees. Recognizing that the patent right can be monetized into licensing fees and damages in an action for patent infringement, NPE have undertaken formalized programs to gather or acquire patents in particular fields. Legal loopholes and inefficiencies in court practice have been identified as drivers of these patent holdup strategies. NPE and their supporters claim that these firms enhance innovation and competition by providing capital to independent inventors and creating an efficient market for trade in technological information. Critics of these firms, on the other hand, have labeled them “patent trolls” and claim that they use weak and vague patents to extract excessive licensing fees. The goal of this ariticle is to shed some light on the business models of Acacia and Intellectual Ventures, analyzing theirs economics and implications in order to offer some normative considerations.