總經理薪酬、董事會獨立性及社會連結：以台灣上市櫃企業之實證為例

CEO Compensation, Board Independence and Social Ties: Evidence form Taiwan TSE and GTSM Companies

陳昱良(Yu-Liang Chen)

指導教授 ： 林嬋娟

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2012.03018

摘要

先前對於社會連結之研究指出，獨立董事與總經理之社會連結可能影響獨立董事在企業內之職權有效性。本篇研究蒐集2006年至2010年間238家台灣上市及上櫃公司獨立董事與總經理之三種社會連結（同校、同事以及同社），並檢視該社會連結對總經理薪酬之影響。本研究發現當上述三種獨立董事與總經理之社會連結同時存在時，該總經理將獲得較高薪酬，惟本篇研究也發現同時考量上述三種社會連結時才會影響獨立董事之決策過程，三種社會連結個別效果並不顯著。此外，相對於傳統產業，由於高科技產業之總經理職業及領域知識的限制，他們傾向與獨立董事建立更多的社會連結，而高科技產業之總經理亦獲得較高之薪酬。

關鍵字

社會連結 ； 總經理薪酬 ； 董事會獨立性 ； 獨立董事

並列摘要

Prior research suggests that independent director’s social ties with the CEO could undermine the efficacy of a formally independent director in the firm. In this study, I examine the relation between social ties and CEO compensation over the time period of 2006 to 2010 using hand-collecting data from Taiwanese TSE and GTSM companies. My results suggest that CEO compensation is higher when social ties exist between CEO and independent directors. In addition, this study also finds that the impacts of social ties are wholly integrated to affect decisions of independent directors rather than individually affecting them. Moreover, CEO of technology industries might have more social connections with their independent board members and they tend to share social relationships with them through social networks because of limitations of professional knowledge. Consequently, CEO of technology industries would receive higher compensation than other industries. Thus, my findings would be useful in better informing regulators and investors faced with questions related to the possible consequences of CEO-board social ties for business decisions and other concerning economic outcomes.

並列關鍵字

social ties ； CEO compensation ； board independence ； independent directors

參考文獻

Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. 2007. A theory of friendly boards. Journal of Finance,

Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. 2003. Executive compensation as an agency problem.

Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. 2004. Pay without performance: The unfulfilled

promise of executive compensation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Effects of social similarity and status on CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 39(6): 1568-1593.