南韓財閥與戰略性科技產業政策的關係-以面板產業為例

The relations between Korean Chaebols and Strategic industrial Policy- take display as an case study

楊智強(Chih-Chiang Yang)

指導教授 ： 曾怡碩

淡江大學/國際研究學院/國際事務與戰略研究所碩士班/碩士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2014.00165

摘要

台灣的經濟結構是以中小企業為主，南韓則是以大企業財閥為主，兩個經濟體發展的方式完全不同，面臨的問題也不一樣。近年來，南韓面板業在國際市場上叱吒風雲，讓台灣社會出現不少呼籲政府和企業學習南韓模式的聲音，卻忽略了南韓大財閥經濟模式可能帶來的負面影響。
本研究透過相關文獻的檢視後，歸納出檢視研究問題「南韓財閥如何影響國家戰略性科技產業政策？」的六項指標，分別是，財閥間的競合、政府、媒體、政黨、商會和研究機構，再以這六項指標帶入盧武鉉政府推出的「十大成長動力產業政策」和李明博政府的「577戰略」兩項國家戰略性科技產業政策，解析南韓面板財閥與政府產業政策之間的關係。
經過本論文設定的研究方法檢視後，得到以下結論：在盧武鉉時期的面板產業財閥因為受到政府較不友善的對待，直接影響政府的管道減少，必須透過政黨、商會、研究單位或媒體等間接的方式，來改變政府的政策決定；財閥甚至為了影響政府決策，還有試圖攻擊政府、減弱政府威信的狀況發生。
另外，在李明博政府時期，因為政府對財閥友善的態度，從2008年到2012年初，政府與財閥達成了一種「財閥、政府共同體」的默契，除財閥對政府有較大的影響力外，雙方合作制定科技產業政策的現象也很明顯。但從2012年至李明博卸任的後李明博時期，政府力量的減弱，財閥轉向尋找另一政治盟友（朴槿惠），造成「財閥、政府共同體」解散；雖然直接影響政府決策的力道減弱，但財閥在政黨、媒體、商會和研究機構的影響力持續存在。
大型財閥可能會成為一個對政府有持續影響力個體，該個體無論國家政黨輪替與否，左右國家政策的方式會與時漸進，對政策的影響力不會完全喪失。本研究希望藉由釐清各造關係脈絡的方式，給本國研究相關問題人士有參考資料。

關鍵字

南韓 ； 面板 ； 產業政策 ； 財閥 ； 戰略 ； 企業

並列摘要

Taiwanese economy is based on small and medium-sized enterprise. On the other hand, Korean economy is based on large enterprise which commonly known as “Chaebol”. Recently, more and more people in Taiwan suggest government and business CEOs to follow the step of Korean business model. But, the potential negative influences in this model are ignored.
This research is going to take six indexes which are found in the related literature review to exam the research question “How does Korean Chaebol influence national strategic industry policy?” Six indexes are the competition between chaebols, government bureaucrat, medias, political parties, chamber of commerce and research institutions.
Moreover, six indexes are going to be applied to two cases studies. First case is an industrial policy “10 next-generation industrial policy” which is released by Roh Moo-hyun government (25 Feb, 2003 – 24 Feb, 2008).The second case is “577 initiative” which is released by Lee Myung-bak government (25 Feb, 2008 – 24 Feb, 2013).Therefore, by using the six indexes and two case studies, this research is going to analyze the relation between Korean chaebols and government industrial policies.
Three major findings in this research are listed in following: First, due to the attitude of Roh’s government toward chaebols is not friendly, the direct influence from chaebol to the government is not strong enough. In this regard, chaebols try to influence the government industrial policy by indirect methods, such as media, political party or the pressure of chamber of commerce.
Second, under President Lee’s government, the relation between chaebols and government is much better the predecessor. From 2008 to the end of 2011, Lee’s government and Chaebols reach a common consensus “Chaebol-government community”. The cooperation between both sides is obvious from the government policy and the interaction.
Third, the relation between government and chaebols had changed after president Lee announced his cabinets reshuffle in the end of 2011. After that, chaebols started to look for another political alliance (President candidate Park Geun-hye). Even though the cooperation between government and chaebols was ended, the indirect influences from chaebols to government were still existed.
Chaebol’s influence to government industrial policy would not disappear after political regime change. Moreover, the influence method would redefine itself time by times. This research is trying to figure out the relations between industrial policies and chaebols, and also trying to find out the roles of other indicators (Medias, political parties, chamber of commerce, ect…)

並列關鍵字

Chaebol ； Display ； Korea ； Strategy ； industrial policy

參考文獻

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