美國有線電視法之節目取得與載送規則之研究

A Study of Program Access and Program Carriage Rules of the U.S. Cable Law

王牧寰(Mu-Huan Wang)

指導教授 ： 江耀國

元智大學/資訊學院/資訊社會學碩士學位學程/碩士(2011年)

https://doi.org/10.6838/YZU.2011.00371

摘要

90年代的美國有線電視產業已形成區域獨占，使有線業者具有瓶頸獨占力；有線業者和頻道商並透過垂直整合，擁有垂直整合企業的獨特能力；進而透過運用此兩種力量從事反競爭行為。為解決此問題，美國國會制定1992年有線法，其中，節目取得與載送規則屬頻道交易之行為管制。節目取得規則起初僅適用於有線整合頻道商，以限制獨家交易而強迫分享頻道、並禁止歧視行為為手段，建立類似開放接取的制度，防止市場力延伸，避免替代性MVPD無法取得必要頻道而喪失商業吸引力、或付出過高的成本而減損競爭力，屬具有結構限制效果的行為管制；其後，電信業者與具一定市占率的DBS亦準用之。節目載送規則則禁止任何MVPD以載送協議行歧視行為，避免市場力量的二次延伸。
本研究探討節目取得與載送規則1992年至2010年的管制歷程，兩規則實施以來，美國廣電市場已有重大變化，包括DBS抬頭、電信業者參進與有線業者市佔率下降。然而，有線業者仍繼續進行水平與垂直整合以及叢集化，使都市叢集地區的獨占態勢牢不可破，是為FCC兩度延長獨家交易限制落日之正當性。此外，FCC透過法院支持的管制擴張，描繪出未來獨家交易限制落日後可能的管制模式。
最後，本研究亦發現我國廣電市場之結構問題與美國類似，亦發生頻道交易不合理之弊病，因此建議我國應參考美國法制，建立以開放接取頻道為核心的頻道交易管制、與以禁止差別待遇為中心的多頻道平台管理規範。

關鍵字

有線電視 ； 節目取得規則 ； 節目載送規則 ； 行為管制 ； 競爭法

並列摘要

American cable industry became de facto monopolized in geographic areas in 1990’s. In the same time, cable operators that vertically integrated with programming suppiers became combined entities. Such entities with both the bottleneck monopoly power and the unique power of vertical integration exercised anti-competitive behaviors. Congress enacted the Cable Act of 1992, which added program access and program carriage rules that belong to conduct regulations with structural limitation effect, to prohibit unfair or discriminatory practices.
The program access rule principally prohibits exclusive contracts between a cable operator and a vertically integrated programming vendor or discrimination by a vertically integrated programming vendor, to ensure competing MVPDs “equal access” of “must-have” programming, preventing competing MVPDs from inability to attract subscribers or increasing costs of purchasing programming caused by leverage of market power. The program carriage rule mainly prohibits discrimination in carriage agreements by any MVPD to prevent MVPDs with market power from influencing more programming vendors, that could in turn harm the competiton of the MVPD market.
The study focuses on the enforsing of the rules. Over the past 20 years of enactment of the rules, the markets for both MVPD and programming creation continued to change dramatically, including increasing market share of DBS operators, decreasing market share of cable operators, and re-entry of telephone companies. Nevertheless, cable operators continue to horizontally concentrate, vertically intergrate, and cluster. Because cable operators are still monopolists in clustering urban areas, the FCC extended the exclusive contract prohibition in the program access rule twice. Moreover, by the process of the regulatory expansion the court approved, the FCC drew a possible regulatory framework after the sunset of the exclusive contract prohibition.
The study also finds that there are similar structural problems and factors in Taiwan and the U.S. Therefore, the study suggests that Taiwanese agency refer to American experience to design global conduct regulations of programming trade, particularly including the exclusive contract prohibition for behaviors of vertically integrated programming vendors, and the prohibition of discrimination for behaviors of such programming vendors and MVPDs.

並列關鍵字

competition law ； cable ； program access rule ； program carriage rule ； conduct regulation

參考文獻

9、 郭佳玫，〈歐盟電子通訊市場之事前管制及界定〉，《科技法律透析》，21卷4期，頁2-7，2009年4月。

20、 戴豪君，〈歐盟電子通訊法中顯著市場力量之探討〉，《科技法律透析》，21卷12期，頁9-32，2009年12月。

1、 林東茂，〈危險犯的法律性質〉，收錄於氏著，《危險犯與經濟刑法》，頁1-60，初版，台北：五南，1996年。

5、 邱懷祖，〈從用戶迴路租用到基礎設施競爭—論細分化接取之管制必要性〉，國立清華大學科技法律研究所碩士論文，2009年。

9、 黃琳君，《通訊傳播規範於數位匯流下之困境與變革：以多合一服務（Triple-Play Service）為中心》，國立交通大學科技法律研究所碩士論文，2009年。