品牌治理的前置因素之研究

The Antecedents of Brand Governance

許熒玉(Ying-Yu Hsu)

指導教授 ： 呂鴻德

中原大學/商學院/企業管理研究所/博士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201300091

摘要

品牌價值是企業永續成長的主要有利關鍵之一，而穩健的品牌治理更是不容忽視，目前相關品牌治理的研究較為鮮少。本研究探討品牌治理的前置因素，深入了解品牌經營績效與公司治理，對於品牌價值與評等的影響。依據股東-代理理論的概念，參考目前相關財務績效與公司治理文獻。收集歷年公佈的Interbrand全球百大品牌，以及Brand Finace全球500大品牌之年度品牌排名、品牌評等及品牌價值等資料，並從資料庫Datastream與網路公開資訊Yahoo! Finance下載與蒐集相關財務、股權比例與企業治理風險指標，彙整與選取連續完整資料，加以分析驗證相關性與顯著性。
本研究貢獻包括發現健全的企業財務績效影響企業品牌價值，有助於彰顯與提升企業評等。企業外部者關注企業的財務績效表現，作為主要的投資指標與動機。此外，如同本研究依據的代理理論概念焦點於委託人與代理人之間的代理衝突，獲利力確實可能被公司內部稀釋，這點凸顯了公司治理的必要性，以維護企業外部者能分享到品牌價值成就所產生的利益。至於無形資產與獲利能力，受到公開次級資料的不足，以至於本研究假設未能確認影響。另外，還發現公司裡不論是否有規模經濟，都能夠實現品牌價值，足見有效的資源佈署，乃公司要朝向規模經濟或者範疇經濟發展的重要考量，值得未來深入研究時多加關注。
管理意涵上的貢獻，本研究顯示經營績效扮演著吸引機構增加持股的重要角色，而外部機構持股所產生的監督與有效資訊分享，也有助於維持財務績效;公司治理風險係數與財務績效有關聯，這些都將對於維持長期卓越品牌價值與品牌評等有顯著性的影響。故企業履行品牌治理會有實質效益。本研究發現特別是外部機構持股的多寡，是有利於企業品牌價值的增長，相對地促進維持企業品牌評等等級，在管理績效上應該善於運用外部機構投資給予的優勢。即配合外部機構持股股東們的積極監督，降低不必要的道德風險與投機行為，在制定決策中善加運用這些公司內部或外部參與關係人們帶來有利的資訊，將會形成良好的公司治理機制。而公司的規模，應著重於資源有效利用與分配，而不是侷限於所謂達到最小平均交易成本的規模經濟或者多樣化生產的範疇經濟能力。
有鑑於目前學術研究大多著重於企業治理，並未針對品牌治理深入研究。本研究建議公開更詳盡的公司營運內容、提供持續性企業財務與股權架構等相關資訊，將有助於更深入探討有關品牌治理的前置因素。企業品牌價值與評等維持高水準，代表對於利害關係人、股東的承諾，可增加大眾信賴與支持。品牌治理不容忽視，企業經營者更需積極關注，共同創造品牌價值。

關鍵字

股東-代理理論 ； 代理衝突 ； 品牌信用評等 ； 品牌治理

並列摘要

Brand value is one of the key components facilitating enterprises’ sustained growth. Although stable brand governance is an issue that cannot be overlooked, the literature on the topic of brand governance is scant. This study discusses the antecedents of brand governance and also deeply explores the effect of brand management performance on brand value and rating according to the stakeholder-agent theory and referencing current literature on financial performance and corporate governance. Data on brand ranking, brand rating, and brand value were collected from Interbrand’s annual report on the Best Global Brand Top 500 and Brand Finance’s Brand Finance Global 500. Also, financial information, shareholding ratios, and corporate governance risk indicators were downloaded and gathered from Datastream and Yahoo! Finance. After sorting and aligning the data through dropped-formed analysis, this study adopts a series of models to determine the coefficients and significance of the data.
The contributions of this study include the finding that sound financial performance affects brand value, which will help manifest and upgrade brand rating. Outsiders generally use corporations’ financial performance as their primary investment indicator and motivation. In addition, similar to the agency theory on which this study is based, which focuses on the agency conflicts between the principal and the agent, an interesting finding of this study is that profitability could exactly be diluted by corporation insiders. The result highlights the necessity of corporate governance to ensure that insiders can enjoy the benefits generated by brand value. Meanwhile, this study is unable to find support for the proposed hypotheses on intangible assets and profitability due to the lack of open information. In addition, empirical finding shows that corporations can realize brand value with or without attaining economies of scale. This result implies that effective resource allocation is important for development toward economies of scale or scope economies. Future studies should consider more to this noteworthy issue.
In terms of managerial implications, the results of this study show that management performance serves the prominent role of attracting institutional shareholdings. Also, the supervision and effective information sharing generated by external institutional shareholding can benefit the preservation of financial performance; corporation governance risk coefficients are correlated with financial performance. These variables will have significant effects on maintaining long-term prestigious brand value and brand rating. In other words, corporations should make brand governance a priority objective. Empirical findings show that the level of external institutional shareholding facilitates brand value growth and fosters the preservation of brand value rating. Therefore, firms should utilize the advantage offered by external institutional investments. In other words, they should comply with the aggressive supervision of external institutional shareholders, reduce any moral hazard and opportunistic behaviors, and integrate the beneficial information provided by these stakeholders in their decision-making process. The above helps shape a sound corporate governance mechanism. Furthermore, corporation scale is mainly concerned with the effective utilization and allocation of resource rather than merely pursues economies of scale (i.e., achieve the least average transaction cost), or economies of scope (i.e., effective and diversified production mechanisms).
At present, majority of academic research is focused on corporate governance instead of brand governance. We suggest the disclosure of more thorough and continuous data on firms’ financial and shareholding structure in order to benefit more comprehensive studies on the antecedents of brand governance. Maintaining brand value and rating at high levels indicates the commitment to stakeholders and shareholders, which will in turn simulate the trust and support from the public. Brand governance is not an issue to be overlooked. Business managers should attach more importance to this topic in an effort to co-create brand value with throughout stakeholders.

並列關鍵字

Brand Governance ； Stakeholder-Agency ； Brand Credit Rating ； Agency Conflicts

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