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  • 學位論文

論搜尋引擎雙邊市場之競爭法適用問題 -以Google搜尋偏愛為例-

The Applicability of Competition Law in the Two-Sided Market of Search Engines -Using Google Search Bias as an Example-

指導教授 : 陳志民
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摘要


於現今之網路時代下,搜尋引擎可謂係極具代表性之產業。於眾多搜尋引擎事業中,Google搜尋引擎乃係產業之領導事業,並大幅領先其他之搜尋引擎。惟隨著Google 之壯大,其所採取之事業行為亦被放大檢視,而受到反競爭之質疑。近年來,Google頻繁受到濫用市場力量之指控,而集中於其傾向將自身產品之網站連結置於搜尋結果之頂端或前端之行為(以下簡稱 ”搜尋偏愛” ),進而不公平地壓縮競爭者爭取消費者注意之機會,產生排除競爭者之效果。 上述指控掀起學界、實務之熱烈討論,而圍繞於搜尋引擎之市場架構所可能引發之競爭法適用問題。由於,學界普遍認為搜尋引擎屬雙邊市場,而不同以往認知之單邊市場。此時,市場架構之不同將可能影響經濟理論之適用,而連帶導致競爭執法之衝突。換句話說,一事業行為於不同市場架構下,將可能於競爭法下得到不同之評價。 本研究的主要目的即係結合法律與經濟理論分析問題之本質,而以搜尋引擎作為論述之主軸。首先,整理搜尋引擎之基本運作,並對照雙邊市場理論,判斷搜尋引擎之市場架構。在確定搜尋引擎之雙邊市場架構後,探討雙邊市場所可能帶給競爭法之適用問題,並嘗試提出可能之解決方向。最終,提出競爭主管機關於界定相關市場、評估市場力量時所應考慮之面向。 其後,分析搜尋偏愛之行為面爭議。於假設搜尋引擎具有市場力量之前提下,以經濟理論分析搜尋偏愛對於市場競爭所可能產生之正反面效果,並為正反效益之權衡,判斷是否有競爭法介入之必要。在評估相關論據後,本文認為搜尋偏愛並未能被證明將產生明確之排除競爭效果。反而,將明顯有助於搜尋效率之提升、搜尋品質之確保,而無禁止之必要。 最後,於得出上述市場結構面、行為面之分析結論後,判斷搜尋偏愛於我國公平交易法下可能之管制規範。而後,檢視我國就雙邊市場事業之執法經驗,參以學理之分析,而針對我國公平法提出執法之建議。

並列摘要


Search engines constitute a highly representative industry in the current Internet age. Among numerous search engine providers, the Google search engine is an industrial leader, holding a substantial advantage over other search engine companies. With the rise of Google, the business behavior of this company has attracted extensive attention and raised awareness regarding anti-competition. In recent years, Google has been frequently accused of abusing market power. Specifically, the company has been found to exhibit a tendency of placing, at the top of the search results, links to the websites of its own products (this phenomenon is hereafter referred to as “search bias”). Consequently, the opportunities that competitors should have to appeal to consumers are unfairly reduced, resulting in competitors being marginalized. Such accusations have sparked heated debate among academia and in legal practice. This debate surrounds applications of competition law resulting from the changing structure of the search engine market. Academics generally regard the search engine as a two-sided market, which differs from its previous characterization as a one-sided market. However, this difference in market structure may influence the applicability of economic theories, leading to conflicts in the enforcement of competition law. In other words, under different market structures, a business behavior can be evaluated differently in relation to competition law. The primary goal of this research was to combine legal and economic theory to analyze the essence of the problem, with search engines serving as the research topic. First, the researchers summarized the basic operations of search engines and evaluated the structure of the search engine market according to the theory of two-sided markets. After verifying the two-sided market structure of the search engine, the potential problems of applying competition law to a two-sided market were investigated and possible solutions were proposed. Finally, dimensions that competition authorities must consider when defining relevant markets and evaluating market power were proposed. Next, the controversies faced by search bias behaviors were analyzed. Under the assumption that search engines possess market power, economic theory was adopted to analyze the possible positive and negative effects that search bias exerts on market competition. The weights of the negative and positive effects were used to assess the need for competition law intervention. By evaluating relevant theories, the researchers found that search bias does not generate apparent competition exclusion effects. However, search bias clearly increases search efficiency and ensures search quality; thus, the banning of search bias is not required. Finally, after investigating the market structure and behavior, potential search bias regulations for Fair Trade Laws in Taiwan were devised. After examining the law enforcement experience of a two-sided market in Taiwan and referencing the results of theoretical analysis, the researchers provided suggestions for enforcing Fair Trade Laws in Taiwan.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


吳恆安(2017)。競爭法下相關市場界定方法之理論與實務—兼論雙邊市場界定之挑戰〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201700552

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