從公司治理與代理理論論股東提案權制度

From Corporate Governance and Agency Theory to Shareholder Proposal Mechanism

林怡秀(Yi-Hsiu Lin)

指導教授 ： 朱德芳

中原大學/商學院/財經法律研究所/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200700595

摘要

追求良好的公司治理，並減少因經營與所有分離所產生的代理成本，為現代化公司目標。我國實務上，公司中大多存在控制股東，股權結構屬於集中型，因此公司治理架構應妥善建制，以減少控制股東與小股東間利益衝突，保障小股東權益。
近年來，股東會召開愈來愈密集，時間也愈來愈短，流於形式化。為鼓勵小股東直接參與公司經營，二○○五年修正公司法，參考外國立法例，引進股東提案權與股東提名董事制度，賦予小股東直接參與公司經營的權限；制度實施以來，實務上有三件股東提案之實例，透過外國立法例的介紹比較，以及實務上案例的研究，本文認為股東提案權制度不但有助公司治理改善，亦有助減少代理成本支出，是相當值得肯定的。
本文共有五章，第一章為緒論，第二章討論公司治理與代理理論。第三章分析世界各國股權結構，探討在屬於股權集中結構的我國，小股東權益如何保障。第四章介紹股東提案權制度。介紹美、日立法例，並檢討實務上案例，就現行法規加以檢討。第五章為論文結論。
本文肯定股東提案權制度對公司治理的提昇，以及代理成本降低的正面貢獻，並參照學者見解與外國立法例，就現行法提出修正建議，期使法律規定更臻完善。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 股權結構 ； 董事提名權 ； 代理理論 ； 股東提案權

並列摘要

To pursue good corporate governance and to reduce the agency costs resulted from separation of ownership and control are the goals for modern companies. In practice, it is used to see that the ownership of a company is controlled by a few shareholders, who are called as “controlling shareholders” and the ownership structure is centralized. Therefore, companies should build up better mechanism of corporate governance in order to protect minority shareholders and also to decrease the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
The law of Company Act was modified in 2005 where the rules of rights of shareholder proposal and director nomination were firstly adapted in Taiwan. The changes refer to the instances of foreign legal legislation and for the purpose of more participation of minority shareholders in regards to company management.
After implementation of the above-mentioned new rules, there are only three cases utilization of shareholder proposal rights occurred in the practical shareholding meetings in Taiwan. Through the empirical analysis and the introduction of the instances of foreign legal legislation, this research shows that the rules can indeed not only improve the corporate governance, but also reduce the agency costs.
There are five chapters of this thesis. Chapter one is the introduction of this research. Chapter two focus on the corporate governance and agency theory. Next, the chapter three is the analysis on structure of shareholder ownership in foreign countries and to discuss how to protect the rights of minority shareholders in Taiwanese companies. In the chapter four, the system of shareholder proposal rights in America and Japan are introduced and the comparison with Taiwanese legal regulation is also covered. The last chapter is the conclusion of this research.
This research approves that the rules of shareholder proposal rights can improve the corporate governance and reduce the agency costs as well. Taking the scholars’ opinions and the instances of foreign legal legislation into consideration, this essay is to raise the suggestions on current rules of shareholder proposal rights and director nomination to fulfill the regulations.

並列關鍵字

Ownership Structure ； Shareholder Proposal ； Agency Cost ； Director Nomination ； Corporate Governance

參考文獻

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