對於公司治理的發展,股東開始思考從「董事選舉」進行改革,從「股東民主」的概念來檢討股東於董事選舉過程中,其程序是否公平、程序上有無實質參與,否則對於經營階層所提出董事人選而言,股東只不過是形式上的「橡皮圖章」罷了。因此,股東行動主義者認為,積極有效的參與董事選舉,方能選出更為負責的董事。 本文希冀藉由美國法制從2003年以降,一直到2009年4月董事選舉改革的新發展,於第三、四章進行介紹與評析。從董事選舉存在之缺失為觀察對象,美國法制於近年接連發展,從股東使用公司委託書參與提名之草案,到董事選任方式就同額的無競爭選舉改採「絕對多數決制」,及使用公司委託書參與提名的替代手段產生,彼此發展相互牽連,也因而影響了證管會的態度與州公司法之修正。直至2009年6月證管會復又提出新的股東提名草案,本文亦一併整裡介紹之。本文第五章的部分,則回歸我國法之董事選舉進行檢討。我國法關於董事之提名與選任法制,因近年受到經營權爭奪事件的影響而重啟檢討。提名規範,除了獨立董事的部分須強制採用提名程序外,對於非獨立董事之一般董事而言,實務尚未普及採用,是否規範上存有使公司卻步之疑慮,是本文所欲討論者。另外,選任法制的改革,是否應回復強制累積投票制的規範方式,本文亦一併加以檢討。 最後,並就美國一連串董事選舉改革之發展,檢討與我國之差異和有無值得借鏡之處?並就「股東提案權」、「經營權爭奪事件」與董事提名、選任規範間之關係,從實際規範、實務判決一併進行分析檢討,觀察規範運作的結果,思考我國能否真正達到提升公司治理之目的。
When it comes to the issue of corporate governance, shareholders start to focus on the reformation of the director election in recent years. On the basis of “shareholder democracy”, the whole process of the election should be fairness and ensure shareholders have meaningful participation. The shareholder franchise should not be viewed fundamentally as a “rubber stamp”. Only when shareholders participate effectively in the director election could make company boards more accountable to investors. This paper introduces the development of the director election process in U.S that starts from SEC’s proposed “Shareholder Access Rule”(shareholder access to the issuer's proxy statement) in 2003. However, the failure of the shareholder access rule made shareholders shift by public companies from a plurality voting standard for the election of directors to a majority voting standard in a uncontested election. The reforming consideration of the director election by shareholder activist also had effect on the states corporation law, such as:Delaware, California, MBCA. This paper also introduce the new shareholder access rule that proposed by SEC in June 2009.There are some differences in the new proposed rule but has the same corporate governance purpose. I tried to compare the director election process between the U.S and Taiwan’s regulations at the end of the paper in Chapter 5. The director nomination process which established in our corporation law are apparently different from the U.S proposed rule, but still remains its corporate governance purpose. Our stipulation of the nomination process still have some questions need to be solved. I observed both the nomination and the cumulative voting standard in Taiwan, and considered if it could reach the goal of promoting corporate governance.