公司治理的目的係為監督管理階層善盡其責,以確保投資人之權益。外部治理中之機構投資人的參與及審計功能逐漸受到重視。近年來國內外陸續爆發多起會計舞弊案,使得應計基礎盈餘管理倍受關注,美國主管機關乃制定沙賓法案,限制盈餘管理的操弄空間,並提高了管理階層的訴訟風險;同期間,國內亦修改證券交易法,加重會計師審計失敗之成本,促使審計人員更謹慎地查核委託人之財務報表,進而限縮管理階層採取應計基礎盈餘管理的空間。研究亦證實,會計報導環境改變後,實質盈餘管理有逐漸增加之情況(Cohen et al.2008;周欣慧2011)。本研究主旨在探討外部治理中的機構投資人及審計對企業實質盈餘管理的影響。實證結果顯示機構投資人的參與能有效抑制企業實質盈餘管理之行為,則審計監督之影響則與預期不符。
One of the major purposes of corporate governance is to supervise the management who fulfill their responsibility, and assure investors of getting a return on their investment. The function of external governance such as institutional investors and audit mechanism are more important. Accrual-based activities earnings management increased after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Firm’ accounting flexibility is reduced, and the risk of litigation is increased after the passage of SOX. At the same time, our government modified the law for increasing the costs of audit failure. After that, accountants cautiously audit the financial statements, and then accrual-based earnings management declines. Cohen et al. (2008) show that, on average, accrual-based earnings management declines after the passage of SOX, but the level of real activities manipulation increases. Using Taiwanese data, Chou (2011) also find that real earnings management increases in the Post-Procomp period. This study focused on examining the influence of external governance system, which are institutional investors and the function of external audit, on real earnings management. Our results show that institutional investors can monitor the firms effectively and reduce the extent of real earnings management by the firms; however, contrast to our expectation, we find no evidence about the function of external audit on real earnings management.