本研究以代理成本來探討公司進行多角化的動機,並進一步探討公司多角化對於經營績效的影響。實證結果發現集團核心公司的控制權與控制股東的現金流量權呈現正向相關,與大部分東南亞國家的公司一樣,台灣集團的核心公司屬於股權集中的型態(La Porta et al. 1999) 再者,對股權集中的公司而言,若該公司存在著控制股東(Controlling Shareholder),而控制股東所擁有的控制權(Control Rights)與現金流量權(Cash-flow Rights)對於公司價值的影響會帶來兩種效果即: 誘因效果(Incentive effects)與侵占效果(Entrenchment effects)。而我們實證發現,在集團的核心公司中,代理問題愈嚴重的公司,存在著侵占效果,控制股東可能基於自利行為,進行產品多角化的策略,進而造成公司價值下降;雖然我們無法證明代理問題較不嚴重的公司,對控制股東存在著誘因效果,但我們發現現金流量權愈大的公司,可以藉由多角化來提升公司價值。
In the present study, we investigate the motive of companies’ diversification in terns of the agency cost and further study the impact on the firm performance. The empirical results show that the controlling rights of controlling shareholders are positively correlated to the cash-flow rights. This confirms that Taiwan Group''s core companies are belong to ownership concentration ones, which is similar to that in companies of most Southeast Asian countries (La Porta et al.1999) As in the company with the concentration of ownership, the controlling shareholder owns both control rights and cash-flow rights in which those have the impact on the value of the company, in which those are the incentive effects and the entrenchment effects. Empirically we show that the more serious agency problems the group’s core company has, the worse the entrenchment effects are. It would decrease the the value of the company since the controlling shareholder might take the product diversification strategy basing on the self-interested behavior. Even though we could not prove that the less serious agency problems the company has, the controlling shareholder owns the incentive effect. However, we find the greater cash flow rights the company has, the company could enhance its firm performance through diversification.