會計師及其簽註意見對初次上市公司盈餘管理之影響

The Impacts of Auditor and Its Opinions on IPO Earnings Management

曹常鴻(Chang-Horng Tsao) ； 陳彰文(Chang-Wen Chen)

《立德學報》 2卷1期 (2004/12) Pp. 127-141

摘要

本文實證結果顯示，由Jones model及Modified Jones model模型發現，初次上市公司確實會在掛牌交易日前三季或前四季就進行盈餘拉抬動作。尤其嚴重的是在掛牌交易後為避免盈餘馬上反轉，可能遭受到有關當局的關切及投資人的投訴，仍持續進行盈餘拉抬之作為。這結果和Friedlan(1994)與Teoh et al. (1998a)發現，初次上市公司只有在掛牌日當年度與前一會計年度從事盈餘管理的結果不同。可見，在台灣股市，初次上市公司從事盈餘管理的時問更長，代理問題可能更嚴重。進一步，我們將高低知名度的會計師和有無簽註保留意見分為(2×2)樣本發現，在不考慮統計顯著水準下，知名會計師所簽證初次上市公司皆呈現公司管理當局進行盈餘操縱之行為較知名度差的會計師嚴重。尤其是知名會計師未簽註保留意見之初次上市公司盈餘操縱最為嚴重。最後，由Jones model及Modified Jones model模型之迴歸分析發現，知名會計師不但不能抑制初次上市公司盈餘管理之作為，反而具推波助瀾之效應。但是，簽註保留意見表達確實可以抑制初次上市公司盈餘管理的程度。綜合以上所述，由於初次上市公司往往透過盈餘管理而產生道德風險，再加上公司治理上的外部機制－專業會計師，並不能在公司初次上市的過程中，發揮他們應有的機制。其可能原因在於會計師與初次上市公司建立長久業務關係喪失其獨立性有關，若能透過會計師忠實反應會計報表給予真實意見表達才能降低資訊不對稱之現象，進而減緩初次上市公司盈餘管理之行為。

關鍵字

會計師 ； 簽註意見 ； 初次上市 ； 盈餘管理

並列摘要

Based on Jones model and modified Jones model, the results of this study indicate that IPO firms in fact conduct earnings management three or four quarters prior to the IPO date. particularily, the earnings mamagement continued even after IPO date for the avoidance of immediate earnings reversal and concerns from the supervisory authorities and the investors. Such findings differ from Friedlan (1994) and Teoh et al. (1998a) evidence indicating that public firms only conduct earnings management one year prior to and during the year of IPO date, showing the longer the IPO firms conduct earnings management and the more agency problems arise in Taiwan's stock market. Nevertheless, splitting the data into high vs. low CPA reputation and qualified vs clean audit opinion (2×2) without concerning statistical significance, IPO firms hiring CPAs with high reputation tend to manipulate earnings as opposed to their counterparts hiring CPAs with low reputation, which is particularly salient for the high reputation CPAs who issue clean opinions. Finally, the regression analyses based on Jones model and modified Jones model indicated not only reputable CPAs are ineffective in declining IPO firm's earnings management behaviors, but in fact they enhance earnings management behaviors. However, the issuing of qualified audit reports can properly control earnings management behaviors among IPO firms. This study concludes that due to the fact that IPO firms attempt to achieve moral hazard end through earnings management mean and the ineffective role of CPAs in corporate governance throughout the IPO process, it is very possible to suggest that CPAs may lose their independence as a result of long term relationship with clients. It is thus important for CPAs to issue audit reports that faithfully reflect the accounting statements to minimize information asymmetry and to further decline earning management behaviors among IPO firms.

並列關鍵字

CPAs ； audit opinions ； initial public offer IPO ； earnings management