繼任總經理類型對盈餘平穩化之影響

The Impact of CEO Successor Origins on Income Smoothing

陳昭蓉(Chao-Jung Chen)

《會計評論》 73期 (2021/07) Pp. 1-59

https://doi.org/10.6552/JOAR.202107_(73).0001

摘要

根據職涯考量假說（career concerns hypothesis），經理人有誘因平穩化盈餘以鞏固職位，本文主要探討繼任總經理類型（內部晉升或外部聘任）對盈餘平穩化之影響，並進一步考量前任總經理是自願離開或被迫離開，對於繼任總經理與盈餘平穩化之關聯性是否有不同的影響。本文採用1996年至2014年的臺灣上市上櫃公司為樣本，將盈餘平穩化拆解為資訊性及投機性盈餘平穩化，實證結果發現，相較於內部晉升的總經理，外部聘用總經理在聘用後較容易提高盈餘平穩化程度，尤其是投機性盈餘平穩化。進一步考量前任總經理異動類型對繼任總經理之影響，結果發現，當前任為自願性異動時，外部聘用之總經理較容易提高資訊性盈餘平穩化程度，而若前任是被迫離開，外部聘任之總經理則會提高投機性盈餘平穩化程度；另外，若前任是被迫離開，內部晉升繼任總經理在繼任初期會降低投機性盈餘平穩化程度。整體來說，本文透過區分資訊性或投機性盈餘平穩化程度，了解不同類型的繼任總經理如何回應繼任初期的盈餘波動性，驗證繼任總經理不是只會使用投機性盈餘管理來鞏固職權，也可能透過資訊性盈餘平穩化來傳遞訊息。

關鍵字

外部聘用 ； 內部晉升 ； 資訊性及投機性

並列摘要

According to the career concerns hypothesis, executives may smooth earnings to retain their positions or avoid interference. This study investigates whether the successor origin of chief executive officers (CEOs) (outsider versus insider CEOs) affects the degree of income smoothing, and further investigates whether different departure types of predecessor CEOs (voluntary versus forced CEO turnover) affect the successor CEOs' income smoothing behavior. This study decomposes income smoothing into informational and garbling components, and tests each component separately. Using samples of the listed companies of Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) and Taipei Exchange (TPEx) from 1996 to 2014, this study empirically shows that, on average, the degree of income smoothing is higher among outsider CEOs in their early years than among insider CEOs', in particularly, the garbling component of smoothing is higher. Furthermore, this study finds that the informational component of smoothing is higher among outsider CEOs who follow a voluntary CEO turnover in their early years, but the garbling component of smoothing is higher among outsider CEOs who follow a forced CEO turnover in their early years. Moreover, the garbling component of smoothing is lower among inside CEOs who follow a forced CEO turnover in their early years.

並列關鍵字

Outsider successor ； Insider successor ； Informational components and the garbling components

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