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Corporate Giving Decision: Agency Problem Hypothesis vs. Shareholder Wealth Maximization Hypothesis

企業捐贈決策:代理問題假說vs.股東利潤極大化假說

摘要


We examine the determinants and consequences of corporate giving decisions by agency theory, corporate governance mechanisms, and shareholder wealth maximization. The results show that firms with more serious agency problems are more likely to engage in persistent corporate giving, while firms engaged in maximizing shareholder profits are more likely to engage in one-off corporate giving. Moreover, as corporate giving increases, shareholders reduce their valuation of firm cash holdings, and investors respond negatively to corporate giving. Using subsamples, institutional settings are examined to explore the differences in giving decisions between family businesses and professional managers.

並列摘要


本研究根據代理理論、公司治理機制,與股東利潤極大化的觀點,探討企業捐贈之決定因素與效果。研究發現代理問題較嚴重的公司,較傾向從事恆常性捐贈。然而,將捐贈支出視為廣告策略之一,追求股東利潤極大化的公司,較傾向從事一次性捐贈。此外,研究顯示企業捐贈會造成財務績效下降,且市場投資者對於捐贈給予負面評價。

參考文獻


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