十九世紀的理學經世：吳廷棟及其學侶的嚴格化程朱學

學界一般認為十九世紀的中國士人已不再關心程朱陸王與心性理氣之辨。然而，當時卻出現一批理學家，他們堅信越是要挽救政教失序，越是要精確地辨別學術正邪，確立程朱理學的正統地位。吳廷棟及其學侶身處清朝各種內部危機浮現的十九世紀，卻嚴格分判理學門戶，並堅信性即理與心即理之別，為經世成敗的決定性因素。他們將政治與社會秩序的絕對性建立在「皇天降衷」的性即理上，提出一套強調心性分判的經世思維。這不僅讓本文重新省思，傳統心性及義利之辨在十九世紀學術思想史上的位置，並反省亟需經世行動的危機時代，正統程朱學是否只能被士人摒棄？本論文跳出強調與漢學對立的經世理學解釋框架，也反省以《經世文編》為代表，偏重治法及「工具理性」的經世思潮研究，以探討清中晚期程朱派士人的經世思維與實踐方式。吳廷棟等人的經世思考著重於「入世精神」與「治體」的層次，他們不滿當時朝野在強烈的「經世」用心下，以實踐與實用為標準，從而淡化程朱陸王之爭與心性理氣之辨。吳廷棟面對政教失序，堅持以性即理為政教秩序的終極標準，而非尋求外在的「禮」作為規範。吳廷棟與其學友以論學、書信與書籍活動為媒介，透過核心人物的名氣與中介人物的奔走，形成一個跨越省籍、地域與地位，型態鬆散但認同緊密的理學認同群體。學界一般認為十九世紀朝野反省漢學，試圖恢復理學修身與經世的實踐傳統，程朱陸王之爭與心性理氣形上形下之辨，業已消融在經世實踐與實用的新標準中，呈現妥協而調和的面貌。為了探究嚴格程朱學者於十九世紀中期，重啟理學門戶之爭並進行嚴格的心性之辨的緣由與意義，本文依序討論十九世紀初的理學氛圍，吳廷棟對經世思潮的反省與他的心性之辨，以及吳廷棟與學友們的行動及影響。第二章指出，十九世紀初，孔廟從祀標準與朝野士人因強調實踐而不分理學門戶，甚至推崇陽明學。北京理學圈主張理學修身外，從唐鑑開始，也編纂《學案小識》批判這種不分門戶的「功利」現象。吳廷棟在唐鑑以後成為理學圈的領導者，以嚴格分辨程朱陸王為己任，並以「明德」與「靈明」，「新民」與「管商」的區別，分判經世活動之心、性基礎，與經世活動之義、利表現。第三章指出，吳廷棟以心性為基礎分判義利。吳廷棟嚴格宣稱「正誼而謀利，明道而計功，亦利也」，他堅持道德與政治活動必須以性即理為「體」，方能達到「體立用行」的經世成果。吳廷棟提出「天理中之私」的概念，批判世人偏於事功與氣節之「用」，錯以陽明學為「有用道學」。在此關懷下，他為咸豐皇帝區分「理學」的層次，並導正曾國藩與方宗誠過度傾向於「用」的經世思考。第四章指出，吳廷棟以心性之辨回應當時的政教失序。吳廷棟以朱子中和新說為定論，一生防範程朱理學中任何認心為性及體用疏隔的可能，並確立「性即理」與「敬」為經世精神的基礎，及其經世成效的保證。他批判明清程朱後學與身邊學友混淆心性與體用關係，或錯以中和舊說為宗。晚年，吳廷棟校訂劉廷詔的《《理學宗傳》辨正》，企圖建立本體與發用的正確聯繫。第五章指出，在吳廷棟的「嚴格化」下，學友皆以「性即理」為經世的終極標準。吳廷棟於十九世紀下半葉，為倭仁、竇垿、方宗誠與楊德亨建立心統性情與敬貫動靜的正確理學認識。其中，小儒方潛雖然對自己創立的心/新說有強烈的自信，但他也一再自我調整，以試圖符合吳廷棟的標準。吳廷棟的學友們思想逐漸趨同，他們合力防堵方潛學說在思想與書籍刊印上的擴散。第六章，討論吳廷棟嚴格化理學在學圈外的影響力。當時河南理學講求實踐而放寬門戶，強調「心」的主動性與彈性。吳廷棟等人極力導正河南理學認心為性的傾向，並因此校訂《《理學宗傳》辨正》。方宗誠則四處論學，挖掘、編輯理學書籍，鼓動程朱學者從祀，以延續並擴大嚴格化理學的影響力。孔廟從祀標準於咸豐十年（1860）轉為嚴格，正呼應了吳廷棟等人的努力。最後，十八世紀以降理學道統地位受到挑戰，儒學出現多元分科的可能，十九世紀開始各種新舊思潮也充滿活力。吳廷棟等人則堅持以程朱為尊，並反對理學內部理論發展的可能，這表現十九世紀學風「多元平等」與「定於一尊」兩種傾向的衝突。此外，吳廷棟嚴格化理學之舉，也可以作為探討理學在二十世紀知識與社會之「現代轉型」的研究基礎。

關鍵字

吳廷棟；程朱陸王；心性；義利；理學經世；嚴格化

並列摘要

This dissertation revolves around a group of Neo-Confucian scholars led by Wu Ting-dong (吳廷棟), discussing why and how they distinguished the doctrines between Cheng Zhu and Lu Wang (程朱陸王) schools, human mind and heavenly nature (心性), as well as righteousness and benefit (義利) strictly, and how they criticized the contemporary statecraft thought on the basis of these distinctions. I argue that Wu proposed a different set of norms to reconstruct socio-political order and contributed to the purification of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism through a series of activities. The highly practical-merits-oriented trends of Neo-Confucianism have blurred the distinction between Cheng Zhu and Lu Wang schools at the beginning of the 19th century. During this period, the Wang Yangming Neo-Confucian school (陽明學) was almost unanimously accepted by Confucian scholars from different schools. In contrast to this mainstream attitude, leaders of Beijing's Neo-Confucian circle began to criticize this “utilitarian” tendency openly. Succeeding Tang Jian (唐鑑) as the leader of this circle, Wu took as his primary responsibility making strict distinctions between Cheng-Zhu and Lu-Wang Neo-Confucianism. Wu started with distinguishing the principle of righteousness from considerations of benefit on the basis of the distinction between human mind, which is changeable and undependable, and heavenly nature, which is ordained by heaven and, thus, unwavering. Wu insisted that moral and political activities must be founded on heavenly nature, being the body/substance(體) of everything, completely. He had deep concern for people’s preference toward function/utility (用). Wu also responded to political and social disorders by making strict distinctions between mind and nature. He took Zhu Xi’s (朱熹) new theory on Zhonghe (中和), in which ‘mind encompasses nature and sentiment” (hsing tong hsing qing, 心統性情) and “reverence permeates movement and motionlessness” (jing guan dong jing, 敬貫動靜), as the ultimate truth. Wu criticized the contemporary followers of the Cheng-Zhu school for confusing the relationship between mind and nature as well as the relationship between substance and function. In his later years, Wu tried hard to rectify the relationship between substance and function via editing the works of Liu Ting-zhao (劉廷詔), while using Luo Ze-nan’s (羅澤南) more orthodox writings on this issue as an addendum. Wu’s followers and close friends also accepted “Nature is the principle” (性即理) as the ultimate standard for statecraft under the influence of Wu. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Wu instructed his old and new fellows to grasp Confucianism in the correct way. Even Fang Qian (方潛), an obscure Neo-Confucian who always debated with Wu, adjusted his own philosophy in many ways to meet Wu’s standards, despite his robust confidence in his own theory. Since Fang Qian did not really meet Wu’s standard eventually, Wu’s followers worked together to prevent Fang’s theory from spreading before and after his death. Wu’s influence has extended outside his own intellectual circle. Wu and his followers made every effort to rectify Henan scholars’ tendency to equate mind with nature. In the meantime, Fang Zongcheng(方宗誠) continued Wu’s purification approach and extended Wu’s influence. Their efforts paid off in 1860 when the standard for the being consecrated in National Confucian Temples became stricter. This dissertation differs from previous researches on 19th century’s Neo-Confucianism and statecraft in that they tend to emphasize the ideas of utility, benefit and “instrumental rationality.” Wu established the absoluteness of ethical and political norms basing on the principle of heavenly nature. Subsequently, “commitment to this world” (入世精神) and “substance/constitution of governance” (治體) were foregrounded in his statecraft thinking. Unlike the majority of Confucian scholars in the Ming and Qing periods that sought external “rituals” to re-establish political and social order, Wu emphasized that nature is the ultimate standard for reconstructing order. Wu formed a loosely organized yet closely identified Neo-Confucian community across provinces, regions, and social status through lecturing, letters, and publications. Finally, while the Confucian orthodoxy has been challenged since the 18th century with new potential for diversifying, Wu insisted on espousing Cheng-Zhu school and rejected any possibility of basic change within Neo-Confucianism. It epitomizes the conflict between “Confucian pluralism” and the “espousal of Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy.” In the meantime, it may also paves the way to exploring the “modern transformation” of Neo-Confucian orthodoxy in the 20th century.