智財權的分享與廠商的策略行為

本文以台積電大聯盟為例，提供一項理論架構描述聯盟中專業晶圓代工廠商與主要供應矽智財的IC設計廠商之間的決策行為，進而討論聯盟成型的利得之配置。廠商或許能從合作中增進生產力，但必須慎重考慮對手與自己的技術差距，技術領先的廠商可能會因技術差距的縮短而影響了它的競爭力而造成利潤下降。成本與生產力有緊密的相關性，廠商之間的生產成本差與絕對成本，此兩者為影響廠商市占率和均衡產量的關鍵因素，若加入聯盟後彼此成本下降的相對幅度過大，可能導致在產品市占率上的此消彼長而造成利潤下降。在這情況下廠商會因為在成本降低上的利得無法超過市占率降低所造成的損失而拒絕加入聯盟合作。除此之外，本文以 Hart & Moore(1990)的架構，分析若產業內每一家廠商在生產鏈中實力相近，並無一家主宰的情況下，廠商如何依聯盟成員的邊際貢獻分配技術合作聯盟的生產剩餘。最後，不同於生產鏈中的廠商依他們的邊際貢獻度分配生產剩餘的產業結構，我們利用Segal(1999)之共同代理人的架構分析若是台積電在生產位置及技術上具有明顯的優勢時，它與其合作的成員如何分配利潤以及什麼是他們在合作時必要的取捨。

關鍵字

矽智財；數量競爭；價格競爭

並列摘要

We look at the features of the Intellectual Property Alliance that is initiated by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, and provide an analytical framework not only to study the strategic behaviors of its members TSMC and IC design houses, but also investigate the allocation of the gains sourced from IP sharing to them. Joining the IP alliance, the IC firm can push its productivity up, and meanwhile its rivals also make their production more efficient via the cooperation. However, what is crucial to whether a firm joins the alliance or not is up to the relative cost-down from which its rival can benefit. A firm can reduce its absolute production cost via upgrading its productivity, but the difference between its own and its rival’s production costs affects its market share. The firm would not share its IP when the gain from joining the alliance does not surpass the loss resulted from the shrinkage in its market share. Furthermore, we apply the framework established by Hart & Moore (1990) to analyze how the firms divide their worth when each member of the Intellectual Property Alliance has a significant marginal contribution to the coalition. While, in the case where TSMC has its absolute dominance in the production chain, we portray the allocation of the cooperative surplus to the members of the alliance as the one to a common agency (TSMC) and several principals (IC design houses) that is similar to the cases analyzed by Segal(1999), and discuss the firms’ decisions on their own productions.

並列關鍵字

Silicon Intellectual Property ； Price Competition ； Quantity Competition

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智財權的分享與廠商的策略行為

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