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  • 學位論文

以新型績效評估決定高階經理人薪酬之研究

The New Measure Performance Indicator as Determinants of Executive Compensation and Reward

指導教授 : 鎮明常
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並列摘要


The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between executive compensation and firm performance in listed company using EVA, MVA, NVA, ROA and ROE to measure wealth creation. The data are obtained from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ). The sample of the study includes all firms listed in Taiwan. The study sample covers the 2007-2010 periods and includes listed company in Taiwan. According to the evidence, the results are summarized as follows: First, the empirical results indicate that after controlling for differences in firm size and risk, our study reveals that our listed company do not design the top manager reward program based on the company’s performance appropriately before decide the compensation of top manager. Second, in empirical result, ROA are better predictors in executive compensation than EVA, MVA, and NVA. However, ROA only consider the cost of liabilities but do not deducted the equity cost capital. Finally, the company belongs to the financial industry; financial industrial of top manager‘s compensation will be higher correlation to measure performance indicator than non-financial industrial. To verify the different industry should adopt the different measure performance indicators

參考文獻


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Biddle, G. C., R. M. Bowen, and J.S. Wallace (1997). "Does EVA< sup>® beat earnings? Evidence on associations with stock returns and firm values." Journal of Accounting and Economics 24(3): 301-336.
Chiu, C.W. (2006), Economic Value Added and Market Value Added as Determinants of Executive Compensation and Reward, unpublicized thesis

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