反思私法人的憲法權利地位

法人是否為憲法上之權利主體或得否享有憲法權利，已是古老且經豐富討論的主題。不論是美國或我國之釋憲實務，對私法人的憲法權利能力均採取肯定立場。然而，美國在2010年的Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission一案後，學界已興起一波思潮，反省企業得以運用言論自由等憲法權利為護身符，排除許多有價值之管制，是否真的符合憲法之精神。同樣的反省，也值得在我國憲法下開啟。本文之目的，即在從私法人憲法地位的理論基礎與潛在的保護路徑出發，探索否定私法人權利主體地位但仍能不遺留保護漏洞的可能性。本文主張，回歸個人的思維路徑，可以建構更有說服力的論理，提供私法人在憲法上妥適的位置。而在否定私法人權利主體地位的同時，讓其代表其自然人成員主張權利，將可以為公共利益之追求與個人權利之保障取得更佳之平衡。不僅在抽象理論層面進行分析，本文也藉由我國過去由法人或非法人團體聲請之釋憲案，以及幾個美國聯邦最高法院案例，消弭此一路徑在保障範圍上的質疑，並彰顯其在未來管制意涵上的意義。

關鍵字

憲法權利主體；憲法地位；法人；公司；言論自由

並列摘要

Is a juridical person a person under the Constitution? Does it enjoy constitutional rights? These are old questions that have attracted rich discussion. Both in Taiwan and the United States, the judicial practices maintain that private juridical persons enjoy constitutional rights. The majority of the scholarly opinions in Taiwan also supports the constitutional personhood of private juridical persons, arguing that private juridical persons enjoy the same constitutional rights as natural persons where the rights suits them in nature. However, in the United States, after the U.S. Supreme Court decision Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in 2010, a strong wave of reflection in the academic community emerges, questioning the wisdom of allowing commercial corporations to appeal to constitutional rights such as the freedom of speech to expel valuable regulation. The same reflection should be made under Taiwan's constitutional context. This article intends to explore the theoretical basis of and the potential approaches to the constitutional protection of private juridical persons, and offer the option that rejects the constitutional personhood of private juridical persons while leaves no protection loophole. This article argues that the approach based on the rights of individuals leads to more convincing reasoning and a more adequate answer on the constitutional status of private juridical persons. This article also suggests that allowing private juridical persons to represent individuals to claim constitutional rights, while rejecting the constitutional rights of private juridical persons themselves, could reach a more adequate balance between are grounded in not only theoretical analysis but also case studies. By exploring the application of the suggested approach to many Taiwan's Constitutional Court Interpretations that were petitioned by juridical persons or unincorporated groups and several U.S. Supreme Court decisions related to the rights of corporations, this article shows the similarities and differences between the suggested approach and the current practices, and reveals significant implications for future regulation.

並列關鍵字

constitutional personhood ； constitutional status ； juridical person ； corporation ； freedom of speech

參考文獻

許慶雄（1996），〈人權保障之基本概念：本質、分類、享有主體之探討〉，《律師通訊》，202期，頁 12-26 。https://doi.org/10.7030%2fLN.199607.0012

陳仲嶙（2011），〈徵收之憲法拘束：以「私用徵收」的違憲審查為中心〉，《臺大法學論叢》， 40 卷 3 期，頁 1029-1088 。https://doi.org/10.6199/NTULJ.2011.40.03.03

黃忠正（2013），〈人性尊嚴的概念與界限〉，《月旦法學雜誌》，221 期，頁 161-174。https://doi.org/10.3966/102559312013100221009

Baker, C. E. (1982). Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish’s “The Value of Free Speech”, University Pennysylvania Law Review, 130(3), 646-677. https://doi.org/10.2307/3311837

Blair, M. M., & Pollman, E. (2017). The Supreme Court’s View of Corporate Rights: Two Centuries of Evolution and Controversy. In N. R. Lamoreaux & W. J. Novak (Eds.), Corporations and American Democracy (pp. 245-285). Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674977686-009

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