從憲法觀點檢討獨立行政機關 －以設置必要性、職權與組織為中心

Reviewing an independent executive agency in the light of the constitution－focus on the necessity of setting up, authority and organization

郭任昇(Jen-Sheng Kuo)

指導教授 ： 黃昭元

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2007.02808

摘要

依法律所設置的「獨立行政機關」在我國憲政運作上是一個新的嘗試，它和行政院間具有相對的獨立性。考量目前行政、立法兩權在憲法結構上和政治上的僵局，及獨立行政機關本質上和權力分立、責任政治、行政一體的衝突之下，其設置可能會造成更多憲政難題和政治紛擾，故本文對於獨立行政機關的設置是採取一種嚴格而謹慎的態度。
在嚴格檢視獨立行政機關的設置目的後，本文從「設置必要性」的觀點將獨立行政機關予以類型化。其中，「不得設置」的類型是基於行政院在行政一體的核心範圍（包含「行政院的基本施政業務」和「政策統合機關」）以及總統的國家安全大政方針，凡是設置為獨立行政機關將會違憲。而「得設置」的類型當中，依「適合設置與否」，可以區分為標準型和非標準型獨立行政機關，標準型獨立行政機關（最適合設置獨立行政機關）要符合「基本權的管制涉及人民政治參與」、「政治中立的需求比一般行政機關強烈」以及「該行政事務較沒有政策統合、跨部會協調的必要」三個要件。標準型和非標準型獨立行政機關的差異將會在「職權」和「組織」上顯現出不同的獨立程度。
「職權」上可以獨立到什麼程度，分四個部分來探討，本文提出職權獨立性的核心要素－個案事前指揮的排除，這是標準型和非標準型獨立行政機關在職權上都應享有的獨立性；至於獨立性在職權上不能跨越的界線（不得享有獨立性）－法律案、預算案、獨立聲請釋憲之機關適格，只要是獨立行政機關在此範圍內都不能享有獨立性。而介於兩者之間的「個案事後適法性、適當性監督之容許與否」及「抽象政策與法規命令的形成」，則因不同的獨立行政機關類型而有不同的獨立性。
「組織」部分要探討的重點，主要是在獨立行政機關的人事任免上。在我國目前行政權和立法權是處於分立對抗的情形下，加上大法官釋字第六一三號解釋公佈後，更加確認我國行政權具有核心領域的空間，立法權若介入人事提名不但會侵害行政權核心領域自我擴權而違反權力分立，且將嚴重破壞責任政治、行政一體，更是明文違反憲法第五十六條規定，故即使憲法解釋上，立法院也不能依法律享有人事同意權，除非透過修憲程序，且限於標準型獨立行政機關。而現行法律完全沒有免職的規定，的確可能侵犯到行政權核心領域，但為了兼顧獨立行政機關獨立性考量，依法律賦予行政院院長受限制的免職權是一個可令人接受的方案。此外，本文最後也針對公務員懲戒法第四條第二項「停職」規定作了檢討。

關鍵字

獨立行政機關 ； 獨立機關 ； 設置必要性 ； 不信任 ； 權力分立 ； 責任政治 ； 行政一體 ； 職權獨立性 ； 訴願監督 ； 政策統合 ； 任期交錯 ； 合議制機關 ； 人事提名權 ； 人事同意權 ； 行政權核心領域 ； 政黨比例 ； 免職權 ； 停職

並列摘要

An independent executive agency set up according to law is a brand new attempt in Taiwan’s constitutional framework. It is relatively independent from the Executive Yuan. Taking the current constitutional, political deadlock between executive and legislative powers and the innate incompatibility between independent executive agencies and principles of separation of powers, politics of accountability and administrative unity into consideration, the establishment of independent executive agencies would be likely to bring up more constitutional difficulties and political turmoil. Based on these understanding, this thesis holds not only a strict, but also cautious manner toward the establishment of independent executive agencies.
After carefully examining the purpose of forming an independent executive agency, this thesis categorizes independent executive agencies by “the necessity of establishment”. The “absolutely inadequate” category contains those dealing with matters involving the core areas of administrative unity under the Executive Yuan (including the fundamental administrative business of the Executive Yuan, and policy-integrating agency) and President’s power on national security policy. Any independent executive agency set up to deal with these matters is unconstitutional. On the other hand, the other “admittable” category can be further divided into “the standard” and “the non-standard” independent executive agencies according to the appropriateness of establishment. The standard independent executive agency, also the most fit one as an independent executive agency, shall meet the following requirements: （i） the regulation of human rights concerns the political participation of citizens; or（ii） the demand for political neutrality is much more stronger than other executive agencies; or （iii） the administrative business has less need of policy integration and cross-departments negotiation. The difference between the standard and the non-standard independent executive agencies lies in the level of independence of “authority” and “organization”.
To which level of independence of authority can an independence executive agency be is discussed through the following four parts. This thesis suggests that the core element of authority independence is the exclusion of the ad hoc instruction beforehand from the Executive Yuan . This kind of independence shall be possessed by both the standard and non-standard independent executive agencies on the subject of authority. The limitation of authority independence is the authority to propose a statute or a budgetary bill and the status to petition for an interpretation from the constitutional court, that is, no independent executive agencies may possess independence in this authority field. As to whether an independence executive can enjoy the power of the exclusion of ad hoc review in legality and propriety of the Executive Yuan, and the power of making general policy or drawing up statutes varies between different categories of independent executive agencies.
The key issue on the part of the independence of the organization is the personnel appointment and removal power of an independent executive agency. The core areas of the executive power is more confirmed by the opposition between the executive power and the legislative power in the current Constitution and the J.Y.Interpretation No. 613. If the legislative power interferes with the personnel nomination of an independent executive agency, it will not only encroach on the core areas of the executive power but violate the principle of separation of powers, and will destroy the principle of politics of accountability and administrative unity and thus violate Article 56 of the Constitution. Hence, unless through the amendment of the Constitution or except the standard independent executive agencies, the Legislative Yuan can not by the operation of law possess the personnel consent power according to the interpretation of the Constitution. Since the core areas of the executive power may be encroached on because of no regulation regarding personnel removal currently, in order to ensure the independence of an independence executive agency, conferring the premier a restricted personnel removal power stipulated by law will be an acceptable scheme. Finally, the suspension rule in Article 4-II of the Public Functionaries Discipline Act is also reviewed in this thesis.

並列關鍵字

an independent executive agency ； an independent agency ； necessity of establishment ； distrust ； the principle of separation of powers ； the principle of politics of accountability ； the principle of administrative unity ； authority independence ； the supervision of appeal of the administrative decision ； policy-integrating ； overlapping terms ； collegial agencies ； personnel nomination power ； personnel consent power ； the core areas of the executive power ； Party Proportional Representation ； removal ； suspension

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