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論羅爾斯的穩定性論證

On Rawls's Arguments of Stability

摘要


羅爾斯在前後期的正義理論裡,系統地探討並嘗試解決穩定性問題,即在當代社會存在合理多元的事實下,如何促使公民自願接受並遵守社會制度的相關規範,以維繫正義且秩序良好的社會?在《政治自由主義》裡,羅爾斯提出重疊共識的論證。他主張持不同合理全面性學說的公民都會同意「作為公平的正義」這種政治正義觀,以之規範社會主要制度。公民將基於這樣的共識,自願遵守相關規範,因而能在多元價值之中確保社會的穩定。本文的目的在於探討重疊共識的論證能否成功解決多元社會的穩定性問題。首先說明羅爾斯關切的穩定性問題為何,其次說明他為什麼放棄《正義論》裡的穩定性論證,改採重疊共識的論證。第三,本文將分析羅爾斯如何證成重疊共識,主張這樣的共識可以解決穩定性問題。第四,本文檢視並批評重疊共識的論證。筆者將指出,這個論證是失敗的,任何採取社會正義原則層次的論證都無法成功解決穩定性問題。最後,本文將提出一種奠基於道德心理的穩定性論證之初步形式。這樣的論證取向不但相容於羅爾斯的觀點,且是理論上可以成立的。

並列摘要


John Rawls systematically explored and tried to solve the problem of stability; that is, given the fact of reasonable pluralism, how can citizens be motivated so that they will accept and comply with social institutions voluntarily to maintain a just and well-ordered society? In Political Liberalism, Rawls proposed the argument of overlapping consensus. He argued that citizens who affirm different reasonable comprehensive doctrines would agree to "justice as fairness" and use this political conception of justice to regulate major social institutions. Based on this consensus, citizens will voluntarily comply with relevant norms and ensure social stability. This essay shall explore whether the argument of overlapping consensus can successfully solve the problem of stability in a pluralistic society. First, I shall explain the problem of stability with which Rawls was concerned. Second, I shall explain why Rawls gave up the argument for stability in A Theory of Justice and why he proposed the argument of overlapping consensus. Third, I shall analyze how Rawls argued that such a consensus can solve the problem of stability. Fourth, I shall examine and criticize the argument of overlapping consensus. By exploring how this argument fails, I shall point out how any argument appealing to principles of social justice fails to solve the stability problem successfully. Finally, I shall propose a preliminary form of the argument for stability based on moral psychology. This argument is not only compatible with Rawls's claims but is also theoretically defensible.

參考文獻


吳澤玫(2014)。〈審議民主與多元社會的穩定〉,《政治與社會哲學評論》,49:1-58。DOI: 10.6523/168451532014060049001
Barry, Brian (1995). “John Rawls and the Search for Stability.” Ethics, 105, 4: 874-915. DOI: 10.1086/293756
Cohen, Gerald Allan (2008). Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. DOI: 10.4159/9780674029651
Edmundson, William A. (2016). “Coercion, Stability, and Indoctrination in the Pejorative Sense.” Jurisprudence, 7, 3: 540-556. DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2016.1236893
Galston, William A. (1999). “Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory.” American Political Science Review, 93, 4: 769-778. DOI: 10.2307/2586111

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