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  • 學位論文

中小型企業融資缺口與資訊不對稱之探討

Discussion on SME financing gap and information asymmetry

指導教授 : 周賓凰
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摘要


融資缺口一直被歸因資訊不對稱,中小型企業融資困難成為社會常態,體弱固然是中小型企業融資障礙,但它是相對而非絕對,若能做好徵信工作,銀行也可做一個快樂授信人。中小型企業大都是風險中立,逆向選擇只是假設性推論,大多數中小型企業主存在是有多少錢做多大生意心態,所以整體企業結構會逐漸往M形方向發展。根據本研究發現公司規模才有解釋能力,其他因素皆不顯著,支持存在資訊不對稱的可能現象,同時融資風險主要來自於事後收益資訊的不對稱,而非事前的資訊不對稱,而這種資訊不對稱仍然會存在於大企業。 融資缺口現象出現原因有二:一是銀行的心態包括捷思偏誤及審核重心等、一是金融結構不完整包括中小型企業單一融資管道及銀行對中小企業缺乏融資誘因等。中小型企業需求與失業率很像,有週期性有結構性問題,政府應明確制定一般企業與中小型企業金融雙軌體制,不但符合現代金融以資訊區隔市場架構,也有助導正單一融資市場向大企業傾斜現象,同時能改善失業率與促使政局更加穩定

並列摘要


Financing gap have been classified due to asymmetric information, Financing difficulties of small and medium enterprises to become the social norm, While frail is the small and medium enterprise financing obstacles, but it is relative not absolute, If you could do a credit, the Bank can also be a happy credit people. Most of the small and medium enterprises are risk neutral, adverse selection is a hypothetical reasoning, most small business owners is how much money how much business mentality, so M-direction as the overall enterprise architecture will gradually develop. According to this study found that companies have the ability to explain, other factors are not significant,support there may be information asymmetry phenomenon, Financing risk both major income from information asymmetry, rather than the prior information asymmetry,and this asymmetric information will still exist in large enterprise. Financing gap phenomenon occurs for two reasons: first bank errors in mind include heuristics biases and audit focus etc, Other financial structure is incomplete include small and medium enterprise single pipe and small and medium enterprise financing incentives etc. Demand for small and medium enterprises and the unemployment rate is like, There are cyclical and structural problems, Government should be clearly formulated in general business and finance two-track system of small and medium enterprises, not only in line with the modern financial information-segment market structure, also helped pilot a single financial market tilt to large enterprises, can improve both the unemployment rate and promote greater political stability.

參考文獻


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