- 學位論文
論違憲審查與政治民主化的辯證－以「特別權力關係」於我國司法實務之變遷為例
The Dialectic Between Judicial Review and Political Democratization─A Case Study on the Transition of “besonderes Gewaltverhältnis”(Special Rule of the State Over Specific Citizens) Recognized by the Practice of Law in Taiwan.
摘要
本文旨在探究我國政治民主化與司法違憲審查的互動。基於人權保障係政治民主化進展與法治實踐的度量儀，故本文以我國司法院大法官解釋、行政法院裁判等司法實務，所建構的特別權力關係之變遷為核心研究標的，擬從中梳理、比較此客觀憲法秩序，於本文所界定的民主化各進程中，所展現的變遷特徵，並據以分析、詮釋我國政治民主化與司法違憲審查間的互動態樣。 憑藉法律文獻分析、比較法學與法釋義學等研究方法，本文擬以憲法變遷、法律反向統制功能與黑格爾辯證法哲學等理論為經緯而交織如下論理：世易時移的自然律下，處於政治民主化的國家，其憲法規範面與現實面，必生位移而有不一致，即現有憲法規範面，與受政治民主化影響，而於憲法現實面所生對之反思，兩者不一所生之憲法爭議。換言之，於前揭特定憲法爭議，既有憲法規範係屬正題，而民主化所生的反思則屬反題。正反題之衝突，於司法違憲審查加以解釋、判斷後，憲法爭議的正題與反題隨即調和成一合題。此合題，即司法違憲審查所形成的憲法秩序之新見解，於法效力生成後，又成為下一波辯證的正題。 本文的研究發現如下：一、於憲法變遷與法律反向統制等理論支持下，政治民主化與司法違憲審查係存在辯證可能。二、以修憲沿革作為我國民主化進程之劃界指標具有實益。三、與特別權力關係有涉的大法官解釋，具體展現辯證關聯，與本文的論理架構若合符節。四、前揭辯證之成果，即特別權力關係之解構，具體展現在我國相關的修法與司法裁判上。
並列摘要
This thesis focuses on the democratization-judicial review interaction in Taiwan. On account of the surveying instrument for democratization process and rule of law in practice is human right protection, the main research subject in my thesis is the transition of “ besonderes Gewaltverhältnis”, which signifies the special rule of the state over specific citizens, upon decisions of the judicial organs in Taiwan such as Grand Justices and Administrative Courts. In every single process of democratization, which is upon definitions in this thesis, the features of objective constitutional order that are marked by the transition of “ besonderes Gewaltverhältnis” are compared and taken as a tool for interpreting how the democratization-judicial review interaction in Taiwan is. Upon research methods in Jurisprudence such as legal literature review, comparative law and interpretation in legal reasoning, this thesis make the main argument from some perspectives as follows: theory of constitutional transition, citizens’ control over the state by law, and Hegelian dialectics of legal philosophy. The main argument in this thesis is as follows: as time goes by, what the constitution says, which has been recognized by judicial review of the state, must be inconsistent with how it works, which is influenced and urged by the democratization of the state. In other words, as what the constitution says is regarded as a thesis of Hegelian dialectic stages, how it works as an antithesis to challenge the thesis, and both conflicted as a new specific constitutional controversy. When a new decision to resolve the controversy is made by judicial review, it could be regarded as the synthesis of former dialectic stages and the thesis of next ones at the same time. Such Hegelian dialectic formula, thesis-antithesis-synthesis, could be a powerful model of the democratization-judicial review interaction in Taiwan. This thesis has some findings as follows: 1. Upon the theory of constitutional transition and the one of citizens’ control over the state by law, that the Hegelian dialectic formula being powerful model of the democratization-judicial review interaction in Taiwan is possible in theory. 2. It is applicable to take the moments of R.O.C Constitution amended in history as the milestone to mark democratization processes of Taiwan. 3. The Judicial Yuan interpretations referring to “ besonderes Gewaltverhältnis” embody features of the Hegelian dialectic formula, which are consistent with the main argument in this thesis. 4. In Taiwan, upon some cases of law-amending and the ones of judicial decision-making, the Hegelian dialectic formula is the model of democratization-judicial review interaction, and this model could deconstruct “ besonderes Gewaltverhältnis” .