本研究以我國上市電子業公司為對象,主要探討企業在不同生命週期下,高階經理人面臨小額虧損或小幅度盈餘衰退問題時,研發支出變動對於高階經理人薪酬變動之影響。首先,探討研發支出變動對於高階經理人薪酬變動之影響。再者,進一步探討高階經理人面臨小額虧損或小幅度盈餘衰退問題時,研發支出變動對於高階經理人薪酬變動之影響。最後,考慮企業在不同生命週期,高階經理人面臨小額虧損或小幅度盈餘衰退問題時,研發支出變動對於高階經理人薪酬變動之影響。 實證結果顯示,研發支出變動對於高階經理人薪酬變動呈顯著負相關。再者,高階經理人面臨小額虧損或小幅度盈餘衰退時,研發支出變動與高階經理人薪酬變動無顯著相關。因此,本研究進一步驗證各生命週期下,高階經理人面臨小額虧損或小幅度盈餘衰退時,研發支出變動對於高階經理人薪酬變動之影響。結果顯示當公司面臨成長期且高階經理人面臨小額虧損或小幅度盈餘衰退時,研發支出變動與高階經理人薪酬變動呈顯著正相關,此表示在成長期時,公司會透過薪酬制定之方式,以抑制高階經理人投機行為。
This study uses the sample of firms listed in Taiwan Electrics Industry. The purpose of this study is mainly to examine the impact of changes in R&D expenditures on changes in top management’s compensation when the firm faces a small earnings decline or a small loss in different life cycles. At first, this study expects that changes in R&D spending are more strongly negatively associated with changes in top management’s compensation. Furthermore, this study expects that changes in R&D spending are more strongly positively associated with changes in top management’s compensation when the firm faces a small earnings decline or a small loss. Finally, the relationship between changes in R&D spending and changes in top management’s compensation is considered when the firm faces a small earnings decline or a small loss in different life cycles. The empirical results show that changes in R&D spending are more strongly negatively associated with changes in top management’s compensation. Moreover, there is no significant relationship between changes in R&D spending and changes in top management’s compensation when the firm faces a small earnings decline or a small loss. Therefore, this study further tests the relationship between changes in R&D spending and changes in top management’s compensation when the firm faces a small earnings decline or a small loss in different life cycles. The result finds that there is a significant positive relationship between changes in R&D spending and changes in top management’s compensation when the firm faces a small earnings decline or a small loss in the growth stage. This implies that the firm will strengthen the behavior of the compensation to prevent top managers’ speculation in the growth stage.