本文主要研究目的在分析公司控制型態與成長機會對於董事會抑止管理性投機之影響效果。本文發現,當總經理面臨退休以及公司面臨小額虧損或小幅度盈餘衰退時,非家族企業的研發支出變動與總經理薪酬變動間呈現正向顯著關聯性。此實證結果建議,相較於家族企業,非家族企業由於面臨較為嚴重的權益代理問題(導因於所有權與管理權分離體制),董事會因此會調整總經理薪酬誘因以抑止總經理投機性削減研發支出。此外,高成長機會之非家族企業由於存在較為嚴重的權益代理問題,董事會將會對管理者投機行為較為敏感,並採取行動因應。相較於家族企業(無論具有高或低成長機會)及低成長機會非家族企業,本文發現,高成長機會之非家族企業董事會在面臨總經理期限或/和短視問題時,將會設計總經理薪酬計畫以削弱管理性投機行為。
This study aims to explore whether the board of directors seeks to prevent CEO opportunistic reductions in R&D investments. How corporate control (family firms or non-family firms) and growth opportunity affect the linkage of R&D spending and CEO compensation is the focus of this study. In non-family firms, we find there is a positive significant relationship between changes in R&D expenditures and changes in CEO compensation when CEOs approach retirement, or/and when firms face a small earnings decline or a small loss. Specifically, compared to family-firms, the board of directors of non-family firms tend to significantly adjust the CEO compensation schemes to deter managerial opportunism. With regards to the effect of growth opportunity, this study finds that the board of non-family firms facing higher growth opportunity has stronger incentives to adjust CEO compensation to prevent the CEO from opportunistically reducing R&D expenditures, as compared with family-firms as well as non-family firms facing lower growth opportunity.