不同生命週期下核心代理問題對高階經理團隊薪酬之影響

The Effect of Core Agency Problem on Top Management Team Remuneration under Different Lifecycles

張雅淇(Ya-Chi Chang) ； 謝佑承(You-Cheng Xie)

《會計評論》 73期 (2021/07) Pp. 133-188

https://doi.org/10.6552/JOAR.202107_(73).0004

摘要

本文旨在探討核心代理問題與高階經理團隊薪酬之關聯性，就控制型態將樣本區分為單一家族主導及非由單一家族主導來進行討論。此外，研究中亦加入生命週期的觀點，將之作為企業屬性，欲瞭解核心代理問題與高階經理團隊薪酬間的關聯程度，在不同的生命週期階段下是否會有所不同。以2009年至2015年台灣上市櫃公司資料進行實證分析，研究結果發現，就單一家族主導企業而言，席次偏離差與高階經理團隊薪酬呈正向關係。再者，就單一家族主導企業而言，在成熟期階段比在成長期階段、在衰退期階段比在成長期階段，席次偏離差正向影響高階經理團隊薪酬的程度更為明顯。

關鍵字

核心代理問題 ； 生命週期 ； 薪酬

並列摘要

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between managers' remuneration and core agency problem in terms of the type of controlling shareholders. Furthermore, this paper incorporates lifecycle perspective as a corporate attribute and investigates the effect core agency on managers' remuneration in various lifecycle stages. The sample comprises firms traded in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and over the counter (OTC) exchange during 2009-2015. The empirical results indicate that seats deviation has significant positive effect on managers' remuneration for single family control firms. The findings also show that the relationship between seats deviation and managers' remuneration is more pronounced for single family control firms in the mature stage than for those in growth stage as well as in the decline stage than for those in growth stage.

並列關鍵字

Core agency problem ； Lifecycle ； Remuneration

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