董事會及審計品質在於資訊揭露政策上,扮演著降低資訊不對稱及代理成本重要角色,故本研究根據世界銀行(World Bank)於1999年將公司治理架構視為內部及外部監督機制,董事會組成其職能有效運作為內部監督效果,而外部監督效果為會計師事務所審計工作的執行。本研究係以證基會「資訊揭露評鑑系統」2006年至2010年評鑑結果作為樣本,在實證設計採次序機率迴歸模型(Ordered Probit Regression)進行分析,探討公司治理董事會組成及審計品質對資訊揭露之影響。實證結果發現內部監督效果之董事會組成中董事會獨立性愈高,資訊揭露愈佳,但於董事會規模與資訊揭露並未達顯著水準;外部監督效果之審計品質中的會計師事務所規模愈大、會計師個人任期及會計師事務所任期愈長,資訊揭露愈佳。
In the issue of information disclosure policy, the board composition and audit quality play important role to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. This study classifies the corporate governance structure into internal audit and external audit mechanism proposed by the World Bank in 1999. The internal audit mechanism measured by the variable of board composition and the external audit mechanism measured by the variable of audit quality. This study tests the effect of board composition and audit quality on the information disclosure. Therefore, this research collects the empirical data from the Information Disclosure and Transparence Ranking System (IDTRS) of 2006 to 2010 proposed by the Securities and Futures Institute (SFI) and uses the Ordered Probit Regression to analyze the hypotheses. The empirical results show the ratio of independent directors have a positive relationship with the level of information disclosure, and the audit quality with the bigger size of audit firm (Big 4), longer tenure CPA and tenure firm have higher the information disclosure transparency.