Rivalry between Exporting Countries and an Importing Country under in complete Information

不完全資訊下出口國與進口國的貿易政策競爭

廖珮真(Pei-Cheng Liao)

《經濟論文》 32卷4期 (2004/12) Pp. 605-630

https://doi.org/10.29628/AEP.200412.0004

摘要

本文採用Brander-Spencer(1985)兩出口國與一進口國的基本模型，來探討當此三國政府皆不知道兩出口廠的成本時，在進口國采行不同的關稅制度下，兩出口國出口補貼政策的Nash均衡。在線性市場需求及高低兩種成本類型的假設下，本文發現當進口國采行單一關稅制度，兩出口國均提供單一出口補貼，而當進口國采行歧視性關稅制度，兩出口另均課徵單一出口稅。本文亦發現進口國的最適關稅制度為單一關稅制度，但只要兩出口廠商的預期成本差距夠小，兩出口國均偏好歧視性關稅制度。

關鍵字

出口補貼/出口稅 ； 關稅 ； 不完全資訊

並列摘要

This paper extends the Brander-Spencer (1985) framework to examine the noncooperative Nash equilibrium of export subsidy policy under incomplete information when the firms’ costs are unknown to the exporting and importing countries. With the assumptions of linear demand and two types of a firm s cost, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is that both exporting countries use a single pooling export subsidy (tax) under a uniform (discriminatory) tariff regime. Moreover, we find that the importing country would optimally choose a uniform tariff regime. However, both exporting countries prefer a discriminatory tariff regime as long as the expected cost differential between the two firms is small enough.

並列關鍵字

Export subsidies/Taxes ； Tariffs ； Incomplete information

參考文獻

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