本文整理學界的「統一戰線」研究,發現長期存在定義與理論上的模糊,導致傳統統戰研究容易落入統戰了無新意,或是所向無敵的兩種偏差。本文藉由「合法性過程理論」,重新建構一個經驗分析框架,定義統戰是指執政集團施展削弱對手合法性、與追求強化自我合法性的辯證性過程,透過六種策略交互運用,目的在形塑與擴張一個超越其既有壟斷領域的「威權公共空間」。據此理論對臺灣媽祖聯誼會的經驗分析,顯示中共在比較正面的整合、吸納與動員策略之外,不惜使用會犧牲自身正面團結形象的負面策略,例如介入、排擠與分化,在臺灣社會中挑動政治抗議與官民摩擦,用來凸顯主要敵人的頑固性與脆弱性,是要給中國大陸內部的統戰工作帶來更強的話語權與動能。中共視多數宗教組織為次要敵人,可以作為「中央統戰部—政協—民間組織」三層次統戰隊伍的一部分,以利於在國際間製造宣傳效果,呼應「兩岸命運共同體/兩岸一家親」的統戰敘事,以及在國內塑造中國共產黨無可挑戰的統戰「司令官」角色。
The authors find that there are two fundamental challenges in the Chinese united front literature that cause researchers to misunderstand united front as totally ineffective or all-powerful. This study brings the theory of legitimation into the analysis of united front, and defines that it is a dialectical process of the ruling party to delegalize its opponent and enhance its own legitimacy through six different strategies. The goal is to shape and expand its authoritarian public sphere beyond its dominant space. Based on this theoretical framework, the case of Taiwanese Mazu Association shows that, in addition to common strategies like integration, cooptation, and mobilization, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is willing to sacrifice its own popularity among regular Taiwanese citizens by introducing negative strategies such as interference, attrition, and division on religious communities. The Party's united front work tries to expose the difficulty and fragility of its major enemies in Taiwan, and provokes political frictions and protests toward them. By treating most religious organizations as the secondary enemies and trying to co-opt them into a UFWD-CPPCC-NGO united front "team," the Party can promote a pro-unification narrative such as "Cross-Strait Community of Common Destiny" propaganda internationally, and enhance CCP's unquestionable "commander" role inside China.