司法獨立與民主可問責性(democratic accountability)之間存在著緊張衝突的關係,而此問題對於台灣的檢察體系更是嚴重。最近法務部對於檢察長的調動,引起九位由檢察官所選出的檢審委員的質疑與抵制,就是一例。為了瞭解此問題之根源,本文將先探討法院人審會運作之情形以及改革派法官如何應用人審會作為改革的著力點;其次、改革派檢察官參選檢審委員的運動策略多少受到改革派法官的影響;第三、由於台灣民主政治品質的低落,使得這些改革派法官與檢察官,只尋求法官和檢察官內部的民主動員,幾乎缺乏民主可問責性,因此變成司法體系的內部民主與對外部的獨立;第四、本文結論將指出,其他國家judicial council(「司法人事委員會」)組成方式(部分委員政治任命、部分委員由司法體制內部的檢察官和法官選出),是台灣尋求檢察獨立與民主可問責性之間平衡,一個值得借鏡的制度。
There is a conflict between judicial independence and democratic accountability. In Taiwan, this problem is particularly serious in Taiwan's prosecutorial system. In 2007, the Ministry of Justice transferred and appointed chief prosecutors. Nine members of the Prosecutorial Council who were elected by prosecutors boycotted these personnel cases. In order to understand the root of the problem, this paper first discusses how reform-minded judges used the Judicial Council to reform the judiciary, while reform-minded prosecutors used the Prosecutorial Council to reform the prosecutorial system. However, both of them ignored the importance of democratic accountability because of the poor quality of Taiwan's democracy. This paper offers a proposal in which some members of the Judicial Council are politically appointed while some are elected by judges and prosecutors to seek a balance between judicial independence and democratic accountability.