共享經濟下快遞平台的人員配置策略

Staffing Policy of Delivery Platforms under the Sharing Economy: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

林翰伸(Han-Shen Lin)

指導教授 ： 孔令傑

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/資訊管理學研究所/碩士(2019年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201903382

摘要

對於提供雜貨和食品快遞服務的公司，有些公司會選擇成為雙邊平台，讓兼職人員也為消費者提供服務。在此同時，雖然有些平台也僱用全職的送貨員，但有些平台只依靠兼職的送貨員。因此，解釋兩者的差異並找出在制定人員配置的決策時要考慮的因素相當重要。我們考慮一個雙邊的快遞服務平台，其可以選擇僱用全職送貨員、僱用補貼兼職人員，或混和兩者。在解決人員配置問題的同時，還需要考慮到跨邊網絡外部性，並解決消費者的定價問題。我們發現，當全職送貨員的工資過高時，同時僱用兼職和全職員工並不是最理想的。有趣的是，無論工資多低，只僱用全職員工都不是最佳方案。我們還發現當不同時段中交易訂單的需求差異量很大時，兼職工作者的靈活特性能幫助平台省下一筆費用。我們的分析有助於我們證明快遞服務平台的普及，並可幫助快遞服務平台確定其人員聘雇政策。

關鍵字

共享經濟 ； 網路效應 ； 食物快遞服務 ； 人員聘雇政策 ； 賽局理論

並列摘要

For companies providing grocery and food delivery, some choose to become two-sided platforms and let part-time people deliver for consumers. While some platforms also hire full-time deliverers, some rely solely on part-time deliverers. It is crucial to explain the difference and identify factors to be considered in making the staffing decision. We consider a delivery platform who may hire full-time deliverers or subsidizing part-time ones to induce their participation. While solving the staffing problem, it also solves the pricing problem with respect to consumers by taking cross-side network externality into consideration. We find that hiring both part-time and full-time employees is suboptimal when the wage for full-time deliverers is too high. Interestingly, hiring only full-time employees is never optimal no matter how low the wage is. We also find that when the two demand levels of the transaction orders differ a lot, the flexibility of part-time contractors is quite helpful. Our analysis helps us justify the popularity of delivery platforms and may guide platform deliverers to determine their staffing policies.

並列關鍵字

Sharing Economy ； Network Externality ； Grocery and Food Delivery ； Staffing Policy ； Game Theory

參考文獻

Andersson, M., A. Hjalmarsson, M. Avital. 2013. Peer-to-peer service sharing platforms: Driving share and share alike on a mass-scale. Proceedings of The Thirty Fourth International Conference on Information Systems, Milan. 1- 15

Felliinder, A., C. Ingra m, , R. Teigland. 2015. Sharing Economy Embracing Change with Caution. Entreprenorskaps Forum.

Fudenberg, D., J. Tirole. 2000. Pricing a network good to deter entry. The Journal of Industrial Economics 48 (4) 373- 390.

Gurvich, I., M. Lariviere, A. Moreno-Garcia. 2015. Operations in the on-demand economy: Staffing services with self-scheduling capacity. Working Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

Jing , B. 2007. Network externalities and market segmentation in a monopoly. Economics Letters 95(1) 7- 13.