平台式配送服務：基於賽局理論分析一共享經濟下的新型態配送模型

Platform Delivery: A Game-theoretic Analysis of a New Delivery Model in the Sharing Economy

鍾冠宇(Guan-Yu Zhong)

指導教授 ： 孔令傑

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/資訊管理學研究所/碩士(2016年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201601314

摘要

資訊科技的逐漸進步，使得許多新型態的商業模式如雨後春筍般出現，其中包含了以共享經濟為主要精神的配送產業。Instacart 在共享經濟的精神下遠近馳名，它沒有倉儲系統，也不雇用任何全職員工，而是建立一個媒合平台，媒合「想要利用空閒時間賺取額外收入的代購配送員」與「有代購需求的消費者」這兩群人，直接利用實體生鮮業者的倉儲和店面，將生鮮食品配送至顧客手中。我們建立了一個賽局理論模型去探討這種「平台式的配送服務」，並期望能夠找到使平台最大化自身利益的訂價策略。在本論文中討論三種常見的訂價策略，分別是「會員費策略」、「手續費策略」以及「交叉補貼策略」。在本論文中，我們建立一個賽局模型，包含了網路外部性與共享經濟的特性，試圖回答我們的研究問題。我們討論的情境如下：市場中存在一個提供媒合服務的平台商、互相存在網路外部性的一群潛在顧客與一群潛在代購配送員。平台商將在三種定價策略下最大化自身利益，並找出何種定價策略能產生最大利潤。我們發現在某些情況下，三種定價策略不只一樣好，而且都是最好的。然而，在考量平台希望能夠盡量早收到現金的需求後，我們發現會員費策略能最大化平台利潤。而在消費者在每次會員期間的使用量，會隨著平台制定的每次交易手續費用上升而遞減時，交叉補貼策略將能最大化平台利潤。

關鍵字

共享經濟 ； 網路外部性 ； 配送服務 ； 賽局理論 ； 定價策略

並列摘要

Thanks to the advances in technology, new types of service delivery spring up in the sharing economy. Owning no warehouse and hiring no full-time shoppers, Instacart runs its grocery delivery service by delivering grocery from independent retailers by independent contractors to its consumers. This “platform delivery” model is formulated as a game-theoretic model and investigated. We discuss the profitability of three common pricing policies: membership-based pricing, transaction-based pricing, and cross subsidization. We wonder which policy is the best for the platform. In this study, we construct a game-theoretic model featuring network externality and sharing economy to address our research questions. There are three types of players in the market: a group of potential consumers placing orders, a group of potential shoppers providing delivery services, and a platform connecting consumers and shoppers. There exists positive cross-side network externality between consumers and shoppers. The major purpose of our work is to study the profitability of the three pricing strategies and figure out factors that affect the platform’s choice. Our main result shows that all the three strategies are equivalent in some situations: They result in the same per-transaction subsidy for shoppers, numbers of shoppers and consumers, and profits in equilibrium. However, when the platform care about how fast it can receive money, we find that membership-based pricing is the best and transaction-based pricing is the worst. Furthermore, if a consumer’s consumption in each membership period would be negatively affected by the per-transaction fee charged from consumers, we find that the cross-subsidization strategy is better than the transaction-based pricing one for platform to implement.

並列關鍵字

sharing economy ； network externality ； delivery service ； game theory ； pricing strategy

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